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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Internet has been the focus of competing visions
for its proper regulation. At one extreme is the vision of cyberlibertarian'
and commons2 advocates such as John Perry Barlow, who announced in
1996 that neither government nor big business would control cyberspace.3
J.D. and Communications Law Studies Certificate Candidate, May 2007, The Catho-
lic University of America, Columbus School of Law. M.A., Communication, Culture &
Technology, Georgetown University, 2004. The author would like to thank her husband,
Bill Schreiner, for his unwavering encouragement and support. She would also like to thank
Charles Kennedy for his advice and guidance in the development of this article.
1 See Langdon Winner, Cyberlibertarian Myths and the Prospects for Community, 27
ACM SIGCAS COMPUTERS AND SOC'Y 14 (1997) (describing and critiquing "cyberlibertari-
anism").
2 "Commons," for the purposes of this article, is "a resource to which anyone within
the relevant community has a right without obtaining the permission of anyone else."
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 19-20 (2001). "[T]he Internet forms an innovation
commons." Id. at 23.
3 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Feb. 6, 1996,
http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html. Federal Communications Commis-
sioner Michael J. Copps notes that "[f]rom its inception, the Internet was designed, as those
present during the course of its creation will tell you, to prevent government or a corpora-
tion or anyone else from controlling it. It was designed to defeat discrimination against
users, ideas and technologies." Michael J. Copps, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'r., The Begin-
ning of the End of the Internet? Discrimination, Closed Networks, and the Future of Cyber-
space, Remarks before the New America Foundation (Oct. 9, 2003) (transcript available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachments/DOC -239800A 1.pdf).
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At the other extreme are those who advocate for a more traditional scheme
in which government and corporations direct and manage the development
and dissemination of the Internet.4 The United States government struck a
course somewhere between these competing visions in its passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") 5 and subsequent Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") initiatives,
which have largely declined to exercise oversight of the Internet except to
ensure that some interconnection, law enforcement, and other public inter-
est concerns are met.6 This regulatory restraint can be linked to the eco-
nomic theories of deregulation7 that permeated U.S. industrial policy at the
end of the 20 th Century.8
The Internet has evolved into a hybrid of competing visions. Although
the Internet has facilitated a remarkable dissemination of information as an
arbiter of worldwide communication and collaboration, it is increasingly
subject to oversight and direction by government entities.9 Moreover, the
Internet, the very platform that enabled innovation and meritocratic busi-
ness growth, now offers opportunities and incentives for the exertion of
4 See, e.g., James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, And
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 177, 178 (1997) (critiquing "digital libertarianism"
as "inadequate because of its blindness to the effects of private power, and.., also surpris-
ingly blind to the state's own power in cyberspace.").
5 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6 See infra Part III.A-C. for a full discussion of Congressional and Commission regula-
tion of the Internet.
' Deregulation is "[t]he reduction or elimination of governmental control of busi-
ness, [especially] to permit free markets and competition." BLACK'S LAW DIcTnON.AY
475 (8th ed. 2004).
8 See, e.g., Richard D. Cudahy, The Folklore of Deregulation (with Apologies to Thur-
man Arnold), 15 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 427 (1998) ("At the dawn of the new millennium,
deregulation has spread like wildfire .. "); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill,
The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1324
(1998) ("The law governing ... regulated industries has been undergoing a great transfor-
mation in the last twenty-five years. These changes are typically referred to as 'deregula-
tion."').
9 See, e.g., In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband
Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
20 F.C.C.R. 14,989, 1 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter CALEA Order] ("[T]he Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) applies to facilities-based broadband
Internet access providers and providers of interconnected voice over Internet Protocol
(VoP) service."); see also Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§ 401, 104 Stat. 327, 336-69 (adding § 225 to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 225, and implementing regulations at 47 C.F.R. § 64.601); see also In re IP-Enabled
Services; E91 1 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245, 1 (June 3, 2005) (requiring VolP
providers to supply enhanced 911 service to their customers).
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greater controls by corporate entities.' ° In response to concerns that net-
work operators could exercise such control, the 109 th Congress is consider-
ing legislation to ensure Internet neutrality by enforcing freedom of access
principles. The passage or failure of such legislation will have tremendous
impact on the future of the Internet.
Technological advances now permit network operators--or, more accu-
rately, the networks themselves-to identify the types of traffic carried
over the network and to prioritize packets." The ability to distinguish
among packetized data is a tremendous advancement, particularly for those
Internet applications and content most susceptible to latency. 12 The trans-
mission of voice calls over the Internet (Voice over Internet Protocol or
"VolP"), 3 for example, has benefited from the ability of network technol-
ogy to recognize, sort, and prioritize delivery of sequenced packets of a
voice call. Advances in network intelligence and packet management have
resulted in a reduction in call latency, increased reliability of service, and
an overall improvement in consumer confidence in the quality of the ser-
vice.'4 The recent explosion in VolIP adoption and the promising forecast
of continued growth in the industry are evidence of the way in which
1o See Christopher Stem, The Coming Tug of War Over the Internet, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 2006, at B01 ("The telecommunications companies' proposals have the potential, within
just a few years, to alter the flow of commerce and information-and your personal experi-
ence-on the Internet... represent[ing] a break with the commercial meritocracy that has
ruled the Internet until now.").
1" A packet is a segment of digitized data (whether the data is voice, text, image, video,
sound or a combination of these) containing a header element and the bits of the transmitted
data. The header carries "control" information for the network to route the packet from the
sender to the destination, including destination addressing, synchronization and assembly
instructions, and the size (in bits) of the packet. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM
DICTIONARY 610 (20th ed. 2004).
12 "Latency" in telecommunications refers to the time delay associated with the trans-
mission of data through a network. Latency in communications over the Internet can occur
as a result of limited network capacities and speeds, the size of the packets being sent and
delivered, and processing delays. Real-time, interactive applications such as voice and
video conferencing are particularly vulnerable to latency because even slight delays are
more noticeable to participants. See id. at 473.
13 See Federal Communications Commission, Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP) Con-
sumer Fact Sheet, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/voip.pdf. ("Voice over Internet
Protocol (VolP) allows you to make telephone calls using an Internet connection instead of
a regular telephone line ... [by] convert[ing] the voice signal from your telephone into a
digital signal .... ).
14 See Nicolas Thompson, Sir, to Whom May I Direct Your Free Call?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2003, § 3, at 1 ("[Early VoIP was] plagued by confusing technology and connections
that made users sound as though they were talking in caves, and with mouths full of cotton
candy. Now, though, new engineering, faster connections and agreements on standards have
solved many of those problems.")
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packet traffic management enables and bolsters the development and de-
ployment of Internet applications.'
5
Internet traffic management appears reasonable and even advantageous.
A real-world vehicular traffic scenario is illustrative: while a commuter
may feel impatient and annoyed when waiting at a red light, in truth, she
appreciates the fundamental need for traffic management to allow traffic to
flow in an orderly manner. When faced with a choice between chaos and a
slight delay at a traffic light, society chooses the latter. In other words,
individuals surrender small freedoms to the government in exchange for
the assurance that traffic will be managed in a nondiscriminatory, orderly
fashion that will benefit society as a whole. But, what if one day that traffic
light allowed only cars from the eastbound road to pass through the inter-
section? What if the cars in the southbound lane were permitted passage,
but only via a detour through potholed streets? What if traffic from all di-
rections was denied passage except for a certain make of SUVs? What if
the manufacturer of that make of SUVs happens to be a vertically-
integrated subsidiary of the company that owns and manages the traffic
lights? The Internet, without neutrality regulation, has the potential to de-
volve into just such a disturbing scenario.
As the increasing ubiquity of broadband access and the corresponding
expanded utility of the Internet transform it from a secondary communica-
tions network to the primary platform for the delivery of all media and
communications, 6 the nature of the debate over the future of the Internet,
and the future of network traffic management, has changed. Today, the
15 See, e.g., Olga Kharif, Vonage's Iffy IPO, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/feb2006/tc20060209_519496.htm
("[T]he number of residential VolP subscribers in North America [is expected to rise] from
2.7 million in 2005 to more than 5 million people at the end of [2006]."); Marguerite
Reardon, Vonage-An IPO Filing Like It's 1999, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://news.com.com/2100-1036-3-6037577.html (noting that Forrester Research predicts
14% to 15% of all households in the United States will switch to a VolP phone service as
their primary phone service by 2010).
16 The trend among telecommunications and cable providers is the so-called "triple-
play," or "three screens," service offering in which phone, video, and Internet service are
offered as a bundled product that is delivered to the home over a single high-speed IP con-
nection. See Matt Richtel, The Year Ahead: Consolidation and Competition as an Industry
Grows Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at C4; see also Robert Marich, Telcos Press Low
Price In Basic TV Battle But Parity Prevails With Bigger Bundles, KAGAN RESEARCH
INSIGHTS, Mar. 22, 2006, http://www.kagan.comContentDetail.aspx?group=5&id=168
("The triple play is TV, voice and broadband. Telcos use fat-pipe fiber optic connections to
deliver Internet protocol (IP) TV or alternatively team up with direct broadcast satellite
(DBS) providers to supply the missing element of TV channels."). The addition of wireless
to this bundle of services is known as "quadruple-play." See Ken Benson, Cable Compa-
nies, Taking Aim at the Bells, Bulk Up in Wireless Phone Services, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2006, at C4 ("In the race with the Bell companies to become one-stop shops for com-
munications services, the country's biggest cable companies are developing wireless
products, the missing piece of their so-called quadruple-play bundle.").
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social-utopian Internet envisioned by John Perry Barlow must be recon-
ciled with "broadband infrastructure, applications, and content; the rapid
increase in users; demand for latency-sensitive applications such as video-
on-demand and IP telephony; demand for security measures and spain
regulation measures implemented at the 'core' of the Internet; and, more
generally and importantly, demand for increased returns on infrastructure
investments." 17 As Senator Ted Stevens noted in his opening remarks be-
fore a Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee hearing
in February, 2006, "how we decide the [net neutrality] issue will determine
whether cable companies and the telephone companies can generate the
revenue needed to justify billions of dollars in investment to deploy fiber
and upgrade existing broadband networks.""i
The Senate hearing was held partly in response to assertions by broad-
band network executives of their intentions to use technological mecha-
nisms within their networks to manage the flow of traffic, primarily by
methods which would restrict third-party content.'9 Some providers have
gone as far as to threaten to levy access fees on content giants like
Google,20 while others advocate the creation of a "two-tiered" network in
which consumers pay more for "super high speed broadband" service, and
service and content providers pay the network operator additional access
fees for express delivery to those consumers. 2' The rationale proffered by
those who support the implementation of access charges or traffic dis-
crimination is that broadband providers should be permitted to manage
17 Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Manage-
ment, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 1007-08 (2005).
18 Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp.,
109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Hearing] (statement of Senator Ted Stevens,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Trans.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1705&wit-id=3971.
9 Edward Whitacre, then-CEO of SBC Telecommunications, Inc., currently CEO of
AT&T, told BusinessWeek that "[t]he Internet can't be free in that sense, because we and
the cable companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or
anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts!" BusinessWeek Online Extra, At
SBC, It's All About 'Scale and Scope', Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/@ @etFdQoYQvQ*F6ROA/magazine/content/05_45/b39580
92.htm; see also Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google's 'Free
Lunch', WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2006, at D1 (quoting Verizon senior vice president and deputy
general counsel John Thorne who said, at a conference marking the tenth anniversary of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, that Google and other content providers are enjoying a
"free lunch" at the expense of facilities providers who are spending millions of dollars
upgrading and maintaining the networks).
20 See, e.g., Mohammed, supra note 19.
21 AT&T and Verizon have announced desires to develop two-tiered systems in which a
second tier of super high speed broadband would be deployed; content providers would be
charged access fees to deliver content and applications over these proprietary networks. See
Patrick Barnard, Cisco Sides with Carriers, Network Operators, on 'Net Neutrality',
TMCNET COMM., Mar. 17, 2006, http://news.tmcnet.win/news/2006/03/17/1469123.htm.
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traffic and access over their networks to promote efficient use of the re-
source, and thereby produce maximum returns for users as well as network
owners.2 Content providers, consumer groups, and pro-regulation advo-
cates respond that the Internet's value as "an enormous engine for market
innovation, economic growth, social discourse, and the free flow of ideas"
will be quashed if network operators are permitted to assert control over
access and content.23 The crux of the debate is whether, and to what extent,
government regulation should mandate "net neutrality" 24-the concept that
network owners should be precluded from discriminatory practices in the
management of access to and use of the Internet over their "pipes.""
Some regulatory policy theorists and economists advocate a turn toward
a light-hand, laissezfaire model bolstered by antitrust laws. The legacy of
FCC regulation on emerging products and services, they argue, was one of
artificial constraints on competitive free enterprise that impeded growth
22 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94
GEO. L.J. 1847, 1864-65 (2006). Yoo argues that
although [use restrictions, access tiering and usage-sensitive pricing] would place
some limits on end users' ability to run applications, access content, and attach devices
as they see fit, they can also provide a new way to internalize the congestion costs that
high-volume users impose on others. They can also create consumer benefits by reduc-
ing the congestion costs and by lowering the access prices that low-volume end users
must pay.
Id. at 1874.
23 Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 18 (written testimony of Vinton Cerf), available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf.
24 "There is no single accepted definition of 'net neutrality."' ANGELA GILRoY, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NET NEUTRALrY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22444.pdf. For purposes of this Comment, net neutrality
is defined as "the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide
access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network; and
should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network." Id. It is
important to note that the net neutrality issue shares some of the concerns and characteris-
tics of other recent policy debates with which it is often lumped together. One issue easily
confused with net neutrality is the narrower debate over "open access" or "multiple ISP
access"-a policy which would require a broadband subscriber to connect to the Internet
via an ISP of their choice, rather than being limited to the ISP associated with the network
provider. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PoLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 159-68 (2005) for a discus-
sion of the open access debate.
25 "Pipe" is a common term in policy and legal descriptions of the Internet and generally
refers to the physical infrastructure comprising the network over which Internet data flows.
See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 125 S.
Ct. 2688, 2715 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[C]ustomers will regard the competing ca-
ble-modem service as giving them both computing functionality and the physical pipe by
which that functionality comes to their computer ...."). Internet "pipes" are not limited to
traditional cables and wires: "[b]roadband wireless service has the potential to compete with
wireline technologies in urban and suburban markets as a primary pipe to the home and
business .... " FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, WIRELESS BROADBAND TASK FORCE REPORT 46
(2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-257247AI.pdf
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and innovation.26 Proponents of the antitrust model argue that the consumer
welfare benefits arising from an unencumbered free market will be great,
whereas imposition of regulation on the Internet could spell its demise.27
This Comment will argue that, in the case of net neutrality, antitrust laws
are insufficient and that the Internet's free market platform risks capture by
the oligarchs through the invisible hand of technology if net neutrality
policies are not codified.
The argument for a statutory net neutrality solution begins in Part II with
a discussion of the inherent design aspects and technological attributes of
the Internet that have influenced its development and governance over
time. Part III provides an overview of the various legal regimes which have
provided governance over the Internet since its inception, including: fed-
eral statutes, regulations, antitrust law, and the technology itself. Part lV
exposes the need for net neutrality oversight in the context of historical and
inevitable antitrust and regulatory failures. Moreover, Part IV explains that
the economic incentives for discrimination by network firms cannot be
addressed by traditional market theory and antitrust safeguards. Finally,
Part V critiques the legislative solutions proposed by the 109 th Congress
and proffers remedies for ensuring non-discrimination of content and the
continuance of unfettered public access to the Internet. This Comment will
demonstrate that the FCC is the proper venue for regulating network neu-
trality, but that Congress must adopt legislation to mandate the FCC's
oversight and to ensure that technology and market economics do not be-
come the defacto rulers of behavior in cyberspace.
II. INTERNET DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND THE EMERGING
CONTROLLED NETWORK
Net neutrality, in addition to its policy debate implications, is a fluid
term often invoked to explain the design principles and fundamental archi-
tecture of the Internet, positing that the facilities themselves are essentially
"dumb" and, therefore, neutral.28 Vint Cerf, one of the founders of the
26 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effec-
tive Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regula-
tory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-03, 2005).
27 Thomas W. Hazlett, Neutering the Net, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 2006,
http://www.ft.com/conslsl392ad7O8-b837-l1da-bfc5-0000779e2340.html ("Allowing con-
tinued market-based evolution will not end the [I]ntemet as we know it. Commencing to
impose regulated solutions just might.").
28 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 930-32 (2001);
see also Adam Thierer, Are "Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integra-
tion, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275,
276 (2005) ("A purely dumb pipe, for example, would be a broadband network without
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Internet, contends that the "remarkable success of the Internet can be
traced to a few simple network principles--end-to-end design, layered
architecture, and open standards-which together give consumers choice
and control over their online activities."'29 The importance of each of these
principles to the evolution of the Internet and the debate over net neutrality
regulation are discussed in turn below.
A. The End-to-End Design Principle
During the Cold War, the possibility of annihilation of large portions of
the public communications network by a nuclear strike was a plausible
reality. 30 In an effort to find an alternative communications network per-
mitting communication among the government and military in such a cri-
sis, the Defense Department-sponsored ARPANet was developed. 31 The
ARPANet was a distributed, decentralized digital network with no single
point of failure.3 2 This "packet-switched" network was a phenomenal inno-
vation over AT&T's hierarchical circuit-switched network in which the
"intelligence" or ability to control the range of permissible applications and
the quality of service for each application was held in the central switch.33
Because there was no predetermined path over which packets must flow,
the packet-switched network could dynamically alter its routing of packets
upon encountering bottlenecks or downed nodes along the way, thereby
eliminating the problem of the single, bottleneck switch facility. 4 The
any proprietary code, applications, or software included. An intelligent network, by
contrast, would integrate some of all of those things into the system.").
29 Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 18 (written testimony of Vint Cerf), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf.
30 Reliance on proprietary commercial networks for all public and government commu-
nications was seen as a strategic vulnerability, particularly because the network was circuit-
switched. In a circuit, failure at any point will cause a failure throughout, not unlike what
happens when a single bulb in a string of Christmas lights goes dim. See, e.g., STEVEN
SHEPARD, TELECOM CRASH COURSE 126-28 (2002) (describing how service to 170,000
telephones was disrupted when a single New York Telephone central office was destroyed
by fire). See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Penn. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S.
844 (1997) ("Among other goals, this redundant system of linked computers was designed
to allow vital research and communications to continue even if portions of the network were
damaged, say, in a war.").
31 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 129. "ARPANet" combines the acronym
for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a Defense Department think tank, with the
word "net" for network. Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 124; see also Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 7
n.11 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3 l.pdf (comparing packet-
switched with circuit-switched networks).
34 NUECHTERLEN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 129; see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMPUTER SCI. AND TELECOMM. BD., THE INTERNET'S COMING OF AGE 40 (2001).
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ARPANet embodied the "end-to-end" design principle 35 because the "intel-
ligence" resided on the edges of the network-the "ends"-rather than in a
centralized hierarchy.36
The end-to-end design of ARPANet, and what later evolved into the
commercial Internet, enabled much of its growth and innovation. The dis-
tributed nature of the network required that any of the nodes along the path
be dispensable in response to disruptions in service.37 Therefore, it was
logical to limit the intelligence in the nodes to the minimum necessary to
pass along a message. This principle encouraged the design of the "dumb"
network in which packets are delivered on a first-come, first-serve, unfil-
tered basis, without regard to content, origin, or destination. 38 In the mod-
em Internet, however, the "dumb" network has given rise to a smarter net-
work in which some intelligence is incorporated into the network rather
than relegated to the ends in order to ensure the quality of service neces-
sary for the delivery of real-time applications. 9
B. Layers Model
The National Research Council has observed that "[t]he original archi-
tects of the Internet made a key design decision to use the principle of lay-
ering to separate applications from the underlying transport infrastructure
of the Internet." 4 This "layering" evolved into the following model: at the
bottom lies physical infrastructure; transport protocols and switching tech-
nologies operate above this layer; and the higher-level applications and
content "ride" atop that layer.41 The original layers model for network ar-
chitecture was adopted by the International Standards Organization 41 in
1978 and described a seven-layer "open systems interconnection" ("OSI")
35 The end-to-end design principle was first articulated in J.H. Saltzer, et al., End-to-
End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS COMPUTER Sys. 277 (1984),
available at http://web.nit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf.
36 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 28, at 930.
37 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Penn. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) ("[The Internet] was designed to be a decentralized, self-maintaining series of re-
dundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of rapidly transmitting
communications without direct human involvement or control, and with the automatic abil-
ity to re-route communications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise
unavailable.").
38 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 124.
39 See discussion infra Part II.D.
40 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMPUTER SCI. AND TELECOMM. BD., supra note 34, at 37.
41 See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 37, 57-64 (2002) for an explication of the layers model and its application in Inter-
netpolicymaking.
4 The International Standards Organization is a non-governmental organization com-
prised of a network of the national standards institutes of 157 countries. See Overview of
the ISO system, http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/aboutiso/introductionlindex.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2006).
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model of digital networking environments.43 Most policy discussions of
Internet layer architecture today simplify the OSI model into four layers:
the physical infrastructure layer, the logical or code layer, the applications
layer, and the content layer.' Some advocates of telecommunications regu-
latory reform have even argued for the incorporation of the layer architec-
ture to a policy framework for communications law.45 The net neutrality
debate might be described as tension over the blending of the layers. Leg-
acy regulatory regimes and economic models have until recently main-
tained a segmented industry in which providers of specialized services and
equipment competed at each layer level. Today, the economic incentives to
internalize all of the layers within a single firm challenge the layer para-
digm.
C. Open Standards
The Internet is a "global, packet-switched network of networks that are
interconnected through the use of the common network protocol-IP. '46 A
protocol is essentially a design rule implemented in a communications
network to govern the transmission of data.47 The Internet actually relies
upon two protocols, known collectively as the Transfer Control Protocol
and Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP") suite.48 The TCP and IP protocols are
open standards, meaning that they are non-proprietary, unlicensed, and
unrestricted. This openness is credited as the most important technical fea-
43 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 552 n.3.
" See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 28, at 279; NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at
552-53, n.3 & Fig. A.
45 See, e.g., Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Public
Policy Framework Based in the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004).
46 In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 n.23
(Feb. 12, 2004).
47 See Oxman, supra note 33, at 12 n.29.
48 See In re Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, et al., Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4799 n.1 (2002) [hereinafter Cable
Modem Order] (quoting FED. NETWORKING COUNCIL, FNC RESOLUTION: DEFINITION OF
"INTERNET"(1995)).
"Internet" refers to the global information system that-(i) is logically linked together
by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subse-
quent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the Trans-
mission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent exten-
sions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or
makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the com-
munications and related infrastructure described herein.
Id.; see also Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercom-
munication, 22 IEEE TRANS. ON COMM. 637 (1974), available at
http://www.cse.ucsc.edu/research/ccrg/CMPE252/Papers/1974.pdf. The Cerf & Kahn paper
is the seminal work on TCP and, while never mentioning the term "IP," provides the foun-
dation for the two-part Internet protocol TCP/IP.
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ture of the Internet because it allows anyone to develop applications and
content, and permits any user to communicate with any other user.49 The
advance of more intelligent networks infrastructure, however, threatens to
undermine this openness by restricting access according to proprietary
network rules.
D. The "Neutral" Network
The explosive growth of the Internet as a social and commercial tool can
be credited to the combination of the end-to-end principle, the layers
model, and open standards. As Vint Cerf explains:
This "neutral" network has supported an explosion of innovation at the edges of the
network, and the growth of companies like Google, Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, and many
others. Because the network is neutral, the creators of new Internet content and ser-
vices need not seek permission from carriers or pay special fees to be seen online. As a
result, we have seen an array of unpredictable new offerings-from Voice-over-IP to
wireless home networks to blogging-that might never have evolved had central con-
trol of the network been required by design.
50
However, today's Internet is one in which technological advances, driven
by market demand for broadband, integrate greater intelligence into the
network infrastructure. Intelligent facilities obviously provide network
owners greater control over their own customers' experience, but they also
create a less "neutral" Internet overall. Unlike the nascent commercial
Internet which hewed more closely to the principles discussed above, the
Internet of 2006 is comprised of application-aware networks capable of
exerting varying amounts of control over transiting applications and con-
tent.5' In many respects, the development of a more intelligent facilities
layer is the product of free market economics at their best: increased con-
sumer demand for higher bandwidth and the correlated demands on net-
work capacity and management spurred innovation that has shifted some of
the end intelligence to the center. Much of this increased intelligence in the
network remains "neutral" in that it simply serves to route data packets
49 See Oxman, supra note 33, at 5 ("The most important technical feature of the Internet
is its openness, which allows any user to develop new applications and to communicate
with virtually any other user. This openness is driven by the sharing of ... the Internet
protocol. No one owns the Internet protocol, no one licenses its use, and no one restricts
access to it."); see also Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration,
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 91 (2003) (explaining that openness in the logical
layer-TCP/IP-is the key to the success of both the physical layer and the content and
applications layer of the Internet).
?0 Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 18 (written testimony of Vinton Cerf), available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf.
51 Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007), draft at 3, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=812991.
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more efficiently, regardless of the content or source of the packets. 52 How-
ever, this same technology also can be used by network operators to pro-
tect and advance dominant positions in the telecommunications, video, and
broadband marketplaces at the expense of consumer freedoms and the
chilling of innovation.53 Since the majority of American consumers have
little or no choice in broadband providers,54 permitting the use of such
technology for non-neutral purposes, such as to discriminate among appli-
cations or content, is akin to ceding control of individual online activity to
the commercial interests of network providers.55
III. THE INTERNET LEGAL REGIME
Internet law is comprised of statute, regulation, and federal case law.
However, because of an institutional hands-off approach, a fourth govern-
ing structure has evolved: the technology itself. In the absence of authority,
the technological underpinnings of the Internet have evolved into a de
facto legal regime in which the underlying code or software provides the
owner of the network the ability to control access and usage of the facility.
This Part will address the way in which these various regimes have devel-
oped and established policies of nondiscrimination and interconnection,
precursors to the current net neutrality debate.
A. Statutory Internet Legal Regime
In the 1996 Act, a historic rewriting of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended (the "Communications Act"),5 6 Congress explicitly declined to
exercise much authority over the Internet, and expressed that "[it] is the
policy of the United States ... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."57 Congress defined the
Internet as "the international computer network of both Federal and non-
52 See, e.g., discussion of advances in network intelligence enabling VoIP, supra Part I.
53 See discussion infra Part II.D.
54 See discussion infra Part HI.C.2 (regarding competition and consumer choice in
broadband providers).
55 See Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 18 (written testimony of Vinton Cerf), avail-
able at http:lcommerce.senate.govlpdflcerf-020706.pdf.
56 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, refers to the body of statutory law
regulating all communications industries and governing public use of communications
technologies, including radio, television, telephone, satellite and, now, Internet. The 1934
Act, as amended, is codified in Title 47 of the United States Code, and encompasses the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as well as a multitude of other amendments. See 47
U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (2000).
57 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 138 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000)).
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Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 58 The Internet is
also described in the statute as "the combination of computer facilities and
electromagnetic transmission media, and related equipment and software,
comprising the interconnected worldwide network of computer networks
that employ the TCP/IP or any successor protocol to transmit informa-
tion."59
Within the 1996 Act, Congress also codified a new classification of ser-
vices, defining information services as "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utiliz-
ing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes
electronic publishing .... ,0 Curiously, the language of the 1996 Act does
not establish a clear regulatory regime for information services, nor does it
explicitly assign jurisdiction over such services to the FCC. The absence of
statutory language and congressional intent has led to extensive litigation
regarding the Commission's attempts to exercise ancillary authority over
information services.61
Although Congress declined to enact explicit regulations to govern the
Internet, it adopted a national policy posture toward the Internet's devel-
opment and deployment that is instructive in the discussion of net neutral-
ity.6" In contrast to its expressed aversion to federal and state regulation of
the Internet,63 Congress articulated that it is the policy of the United States
is to "encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet ..... ,6 Protection of individual autonomy
over the private Internet experience, as contemplated by this policy state-
ment, is central to the net neutrality debate. Congress also issued a mandate
to the Commission and state regulatory bodies to "encourage the deploy-
ment..., of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans...
by utilizing ... price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that
promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.
65
This instruction highlights another issue central to the net neutrality de-
bate: how to promote the deployment of "advanced telecommunications
capability" (broadband) without discouraging infrastructure investment. To
date, the Commission has employed a regulatory forbearance approach, in
58 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(1).
'9 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(3).
60 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 59 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000)).
61 See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
62 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
63 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
64 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3).
65 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 153.
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part, according to Chairman Kevin Martin, "because we don't want to im-
pede companies' ability to invest.
66
B. FCC Regulation by Rulemaking
Contrary to the widely-held belief that the FCC has shied away from the
regulation of the Internet, the Commission has both implicitly and explic-
itly regulated the Internet for more than forty years. The Commission's
67 oComputer Inquiries, a series of regulatory decisions regarding the use of
computer technologies in communications networks, laid a foundation for
the policies affecting the Internet today. Robert Cannon, FCC Senior
Counsel for Internet Issues, contends that the Computer Inquiries "were a
necessary precondition for the success of the Internet. ''68 Moreover, be-
cause the deployment of the commercial Internet primarily occurred over
telecommunications and cable infrastructure, the FCC implicitly shaped
the deployment of the Internet through its legacy common carrier tele-
phone and cable television regulatory regimes, and through ancillary juris-
diction applied to information services under Title I of the Act.69 Finally,
66 Ken Belson, Senate Bill to Address Fears of Blocked Access to Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2006, at C9.
67 See generally In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdepend-
ence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7
F.C.C.2d 11 (Nov. 1966) [hereinafter Computer I NOI]; In re Regulatory and Policy Prob-
lems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and
Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (Apr. 1970) [hereinafter
Computer I Tentative Decision]; In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, Final Decision
and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (Mar. 1971) [hereinafter Computer I Final Decision]; Amend-
ment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 F.C.C.2d
358 (May 1979) [hereinafter Computer II Tentative Decision]; In re Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (Apr. 1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final Decision]; In re
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Com-
puter Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (May 1986) [hereinafter Computer III].
68 Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's Computer
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 169 (2003).
6 See generally In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of
Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services;
Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of En-
hanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer III and ONA
Safeguards and Requirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies
for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided VI4
Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling
or, Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via
Fiber to the Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report & Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Wireline
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the Commission has initiated a proposed rulemaking on lIP-enabled ser-
vices seeking comments70 and guidance as to whether to regulate at all;
and, if so, to what extent, and for which services.7' Each of these regulatory
regimes, past and proposed, is discussed in turn.
1. The Computer Inquiries
In this series of rulemakings spanning the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the
Commission developed and honed a distinction between "enhanced ser-
vices" and "basic" communications services.72 In the first series of rule-
makings, known as Computer I, the FCC distinguished computer network
data exchange from traditional telephony communications, noting that,
even as it was dependent upon the underlying communications network to
transmit the data between computers, data processing was a distinct prod-
uct from voice telephony service.73 The Commission also recognized that
permitting the underlying monopolist communications network providers
to enter the nascent data processing market could squelch competitive en-
try.74 It determined that voice and data processing services should be
treated differently in terms of regulation75 and adopted the so-called
"maximum separation policy," which permitted common carriers to enter
the data processing market only by effecting a complete structural separa-
tion in which the data processing service would be provided by an affili-
Broadband Report and Order] for a comprehensive history of Internet regulation by the
FCC from the Computer Inquiries through Brand X.
70 In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (Feb.
12, 2004). "We seek comment on the impact that IP-enabled services, many of which are
accessed over the Internet, have had and will continue to have on the United States' com-
munications landscape." Id. 1 1.
71 Id. 2
This Commission must ... ask whether it can best meet its role of safeguarding the
public interest by continuing its established policy of minimal regulation of the Inter-
net and the services provided over it .... We seek comment on how we might distin-
guish among such services, and on whether any regulatory treatment would be appro-
priate for any class of services.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
72 Cannon, supra note 68, at 183-86. "Enhanced services" later became known as in-
formation services, or IP-enabled services. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.73 See id. at 180-8 1.
74 See Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 66, 25 ("[Competition] concerns
stem from the potential of common carriers to subsidize their data processing operations
twith revenues and resources available from their regulated services thereby enabling them
to dominate the data processing market by underpricing their data processing services.")
75 See id. 20, 24 (explaining that data processing services, as a competitive industry,
would not be regulated, but that communications services by common carriers would con-
tinue to be regulated).
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ated company rather than the carrier.76 The imposition of regulation on the
method by which carriers could offer a service rather than regulating the
provision of the service itself marked a turning point and presaged the
Commission's approach to the Internet: unregulated data processing (in-
formation) services would be legally distinct from the regulated communi-
cations networks over which they were provided.77
In the second series of data processing decisions, known collectively as
Computer II, the Commission moved closer to the current Internet regula-
tory regime. First, it eased back from the "maximum separation" posture to
permit all but the monopolist common carriers to remain in the data proc-
essing market without mandatory separation.78 The Commission also insti-
tuted an access requirement much like those being called for by net neu-
trality advocates today: basic service carriers who sought to offer enhanced
services had to also provide to other enhanced service providers non-
discriminatory access to their basic services.79 However, as technological
advances made distinguishing between data processing and traditional
communications more difficult, "the Commission created a framework in
Computer II that defined and distinguished between 'basic services' and
'enhanced services"' 80 with greater specificity than in Computer I. Com-
puter II also marked the end of Title II jurisdiction over enhanced services,
since they were determined not to be communications common carrier
services.8" The Commission rejected a need for regulating enhanced ser-
vices, but reserved authority to do so as needed per ancillary jurisdiction
76 See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 67, 16 ("In order to implement our con-
cept of 'maximum separation,' we have sought to establish requisites affecting the mode of
operation of common carriers and their data processing affiliates.").
77 See id. 30 ("[We are not seeking to regulate data processing as such, nor are we
attempting to regulate the substance of any carrier's offerings of data processing. Rather,
we are limiting regulation to requirements respecting the framework in which a carrier may
publicly offer particular non-regulated services, the nature and characteristics of which
require separation before predictable abuses are given opportunity to arise.").
8 In the Computer H Final Decision, the Commission retreated from a "maximum
separation" policy applicable to all telecommunications providers, in favor of a more nu-
anced, light-hand approach in which only AT&T and GTE would be subject to structural
separation requirements. See Computer 11 Final Decision, supra note 67, 228 ("[W]e
believe that continued application of our maximum separation policy to all carriers is inap-
propriate .... Separation is appropriate [only] in those cases in which there is a substantial
threat of injury to the communications ratepayer and where other regulatory tools would not
suffice.").
79 Id. T 231.
80 Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 69, 1 23 (citing In re Amendment
of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry),
Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 [citations incorrect in original; see 1 90-97] (Apr. 1980)).
81 Computer H Final Decision, supra note 67, 132. A "common carrier" is "any per-
son engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy .... 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000).
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under Title I of the Communications Act," precisely where jurisdiction
over the Internet remains today.
The Computer III proceedings removed all structural separation, instead
imposing comparably efficient interconnection ("CEI") and open network
access ("ONA") requirements on the monopoly carriers.83 Under Computer
III, a host of tariff, reporting, interconnection, and unbundling require-
ments were imposed on common carriers in exchange for permission to
provide enhanced services themselves, 84 a regime which continued until
2005.s8
2. Wireline Regulation
The mandate of the FCC is to regulate telecommunications in the United
States. 6 For much of the 20th Century, the focus of telecommunications
regulation involved oversight of a single company, AT&T (and its subsidi-
aries), which enjoyed a "natural monopoly ' 87 throughout the majority of
the country.8 In exchange for permission to retain this monopoly power,
the Commission imposed retail rate regulations to limit AT&T's ability to
extract monopoly rents.89 The Commission initially refrained, however,
82 Id.
83 In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Com-
mon Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof; Communications Protocols
under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 104
F.C.C.2d 958, In 3-4 (May 15, 1986).
84 See Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 69, 26-28.
85 See id. 30 (describing the continued application of the Computer III regime to the
Bell Operating Companies) and 41 (rejecting the continued application of the regime to
wireline broadband providers).86 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 652 ("AN ACT [t]o
provide for the regulation of interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for
other purposes."); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) ("[T]here is created a commission to be known as
the 'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall be constituted .... and which shall
execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter.").
87 A natural monopoly is "[a] monopoly resulting from a circumstance over which
the monopolist has no power, as when the market for a product is so limited that only
one plant is needed to meet demand." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (8th ed. 2004);
see also Frischmann, supra note 17, at 930 ('"The concept of a natural monopoly recog-
nizes that for certain markets, it may be socially desirable to have a single producer, in
which case government regulation may be necessary for a variety of reasons (e.g., to
constrain monopoly pricing).").
88 While the vast majority of the United States was dependent upon AT&T for tele-
phone service, those areas not served by AT&T local exchanges were served instead by
state-sanctioned monopolies such as New York's GTE. See NuEcHTERLEIN & WEISER,
supra note 24, at 55.
89 In cases of natural monopoly, regulators historically awarded the most efficient
firm (or in the case of telephony, perhaps the only firm in the market) and obtained an
agreement from the firm to provide dependable service at low rates in exchange for
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from imposing restrictions on profit-seeking in adjacent markets such as
telecommunications equipment.9° Beginning around 1970, however, the
"naturalness" of the telephony monopoly came under fire as competitors
sought entry into the market.9 The Computer Inquiries decisions and the
economic policies of deregulation shaped the Commission's regulation of
wireline92 common carriers until the 1996 Act.
3. Information or "IP-Enabled" Services
Upon enactment of the 1996 Act, the Commission quickly moved to des-
ignate all of the wireline services previously defined as "enhanced ser-
vices" under the Computer Inquiries as "information services" under the
Act. 93 Beginning in 2004, the Commission issued Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking seeking guidance on the treatment of information services,
also known as "IP-enabled services," in regulatory proceedings before the
Commission. 94 Finally, the Commission lifted most of the remaining re-
strictions and access requirements for legacy common carrier broadband
Internet provisions in August 2005, reclassifying digital-subscriber-line
("DSL") and other wireline broadband provisions as information services.95
4. Cable Modem Regulation
Whereas historically the common carriers were required to unbundle
their transmission services to allow competitor services access to the un-
derlying facility, cable providers have never been held to such obliga-
protection of that monopoly position. Id. at 12-13. The Supreme Court has described the
history behind rate regulation for natural monopoly firms this way: "Companies providing
telephone service have traditionally been regulated as monopolistic public utilities. At
the dawn of modem utility regulation, in order to offset monopoly power and ensure
affordable, stable public access to a utility's goods or services, legislatures enacted rate
schedules to fix the prices a utility could charge." Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC,
535 U.S. 467, 477 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
90 See Cannon, supra note 68, at 185.
91 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEiSER, supra note 24, at 14-15.
92 See id. 31 ("[T]he term 'wireline' [means] those landline networks-such as ordinary
telephone networks-that are designed chiefly to provide point-to-point voice and data
services.").
93 See In re Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272
of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,905, 102-06 (Dec. 23, 1996).
94 In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 1
(Feb. 12, 2004).
95 See Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 69, 1-3. The Report and
Order refers to "wireline broadband Internet access service," which includes DSL. Id. 9
n.15.
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tions.96 As cable modem broadband services proliferated at the turn of the
21" t Century, however, some state and local franchising authorities attached
an open access, or multiple Internet Service Provider ("ISP") access, re-
quirement as a precondition for approval or renewal of a cable provider's
franchise agreement. 97 Cable operators challenged these requirements, de-
manding that the cable broadband network be opened to competitor ISPs,
arguing that only the FCC had the statutory authority to regulate cable mo-
dems. The Ninth Circuit sided with the cable operators in AT&T Corp. v.
City of Portland, stripping local authorities' ability to make network access
demands on cable companies in exchange for franchise rights.98 The Com-
mission bolstered this position by issuing a declaratory ruling in 2002 in
which it exercised Title I ancillary authority to designate cable modem
services as "information services" and declined to impose a common car-
rier-like forced-access regime.99 This decision was challenged and ulti-
mately upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in NCTA v. Brand X Internet
Services ("Brand X").' °° Brand X effectively released all Internet access
services from the strictures of common carrier regulation.' °'
5. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Although the 1996 Act adopted a definition of information services, it re-
frained from providing a clear indication of the regulatory jurisdiction and
FCC authority over this classification of services.0 2 The Commission re-
sponded to this void by applying ancillary authority under Title I of the
Communications Act,0 3 to a number of rulemakings regarding information
services.' 4 In Brand X, the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's determina-
96 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 160.
97 See id. at 162.
98 See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2000).
99 Cable Modem Order, supra note 48, 72.
100 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. ("Brand X'), 545 U.S.
967, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005).
101 See Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 69, 1 ("In this Order, we
establish a new regulatory framework for broadband Internet access services offered by
wireline facilities-based providers . . . reinforced by and consistent with the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in NCTA v. Brand X.").
102 See discussion supra Part III.A.
103 See Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2696 ("Information-service providers, by contrast, are
not subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the Com-
mission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications .... (citing 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-161)).
104 See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 255 and 251(a)(2) of the Communications
Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and
Further Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 6417, 93-108 (July 14, 1999) (invoking ancillary
authority to impose section 255-like disability access obligations on providers of voicemail
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tion that information service providers are not subject to common carrier
regulation under Title II of the Communications Act,10 5 and affirmed the
Commission's invocation of its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate
information services.106
C. FCC Policies of Nondiscrimination
In recent years, the FCC has at times appeared to adopt a non-
discrimination posture regarding Internet access. In 2005, the Commission
uncharacteristically intervened on behalf of an Internet communications
provider who was being blocked from traversing a rival's network. What
made this move "uncharacteristic" is that the Commission had never for-
mally enacted Internet non-discrimination regulations, opting instead to
encourage neutral practices via a non-binding policy statement.
1. Madison River
. In March of 2005, the FCC entered into a consent decree with Madison
River Communications, LLC ("Madison River"), in which the company
agreed to pay a fine of $15,000 for blocking Vonage's VoIP services from
traversing its network. 10 7 Although the enforcement action resulted in a
consent decree rather than a finding of liability, the unprecedented action
indicated a possible trend in enforcing neutral networks. However, in tes-
timony before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Commit-
tee on February 7. 2006, Vonage chief executive Jeffrey Citron expressed
concern that "should Madison River reengage in blocking today, the FCC
may not be able to act appropriately to stop them .... 108 His uncertainty
derives from the fact that the Madison River consent decree was entered
into under the pre-Brand-X regulatory regime in which DSL was regulated
as a telecommunications service' °9 After Brand X, it is unclear whether the
and interactive menu services); Cable Modem Order, supra note 48, 75-76, 96 (describ-
ing precedent for the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction under Title I authority over cable
modem service).
105 Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2695 (affirming the Commission's decision to exempt informa-
tion services from mandatory common carriage regulation under Title II); see also Cable
Modem Order, supra note 48, 75-76.
106 BrandX, 125 S.Ct. at 2696.
107 In re Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4296-97 (Mar.
3, 2005) (adopting the consent decree between the Commission and Madison River Com-
munications, LLC, and incorporating it by reference); see also Declan McCullagh, Telco
Agrees to Stop Blocking VoIP Calls, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 2005,
http://news.com.com/2100-7352_3-5598633.html.
108 Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 18 (transcript of Q&A led by Sen. Ted Stevens,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1705&witid=397 1.
109 Id. (answers of Jeffrey Citron).
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Madison River consent decree is reliable precedent for enforcement actions
against future allegations of Internet traffic blocking by Madison River or
others.
2. The Internet Policy Statement
In conjunction with its order to re-classify DSL service from a telecom-
munication to an information service"O in August 2005, the Commission
issued a Policy Statement in which it adopted principles "to ensure that
broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable and accessible
for all consumers.""' The statement formally adopted principles advocated
in 2004 by former Commission Chairman Michael K. Powell, who urged
industry to adopt "Internet Freedom" principles as a measure to insure
against future regulation." 12 In the Statement, the Commission reasserted its
ancillary jurisdiction "to ensure that providers of telecommunications for
Internet access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) services are oper-
ated in a neutral manner."' 13 The Commission further asserted that it has "a
duty to preserve and promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet
as the telecommunications marketplace enters the broadband age."' 4 How-
ever, the Commission indicated a reticence to implement this duty through
mandatory network operator compliance obligations, noting that the Com-
mission intends only to apply the principles "subject to reasonable network
management."'" 5 Nonetheless, because a policy statement is not a rule and
is nonbinding," 6 the Commission is free to pursue an entirely different
110 Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 68, 12.
111 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecom-
munications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 4 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy
Statement].
112 See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks before the
Silicon Flatirons Symposium on "The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory
Regime for the Internet Age" at the University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colo-
rado: Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles For The Industry (Feb. 8, 2004)
(transcript available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
243556A1.pdf); see also Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, "Powell Urges Industry to Adopt 'Net
Freedom' Principles," News Release (Feb. 9, 2004),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-243689A1 .pdf.
13 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 111, 4.
14 Id. 5.
"'5 Id. 1 5, n. 15.
116 See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("[A policy statement is] 'neither a rule nor a precedent.... [L]ike a press release,
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approach than these articulated principles. The fact that the Commission
was inclined to issue such a statement, however, is indicative of the impor-
tance of the net neutrality issue and the inherent role of the FCC in Internet
governance.
D. Technology as De Facto Regulation
1. Code is law: Network Architecture and Programming Code"7
As the commercial Internet emerged in the 1990s as the seemingly unfet-
tered frontier of Barlow's manifesto, legal scholars like Lawrence Lessig
applied theories of architecture-as-regulation to posit that computer code
and network architecture could serve as alternative means of regulation." 8
Just as a variety of forces-including social norms, values, religion, and
economics, in addition to state and federal laws--create architectures of
constraints regulating human social behavior, code and network design
provide the definitions and architecture through which the development,
dissemination, and uses of the Internet manifest." 9 As network technology
becomes more advanced, the opportunity for de facto regulation of online
activity increases, and the need for laws ensuring a neutral network be-
come imperative.
2. Deep Packet Inspection
Deep packet inspection ("DPI") is a technology that allows the network
to examine the data within a through-passing packet. 2 ° Prior to DPI devel-
opment, packet inspection was "shallow," meaning that the network only
"looked" at header information on packets, which contains simple routing
and addressing information.' 2 ' DPI-capable network devices can identify
[it] presages an upcoming rulemaking or announces the course which the agency intends to
follow in future adjudications."' (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33
(D.C. Cir. 1974))).
".. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (announcing
that "[c]ode is law") (emphasis in original).
118 id.
"9 Id. at 86-90.
120 See Deep Packet Inspection, NETWORKWORLD,
http:llwww.networkworld.comdetails/6299.htm ("Deep packet inspection directs, persists,
filters and logs IP-based applications and Web services traffic based on content encapsu-
lated in a packet's header or payload, regardless of the protocol or application type.").
121 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 122 (likening the header of an Inter-
net packet to a label on a package, "convey[ing] information about the packet's destina-
tion."). The "header" of a packet can be thought of as the information on the outside of a
piece of mail sent through the postal service: it contains information as to who sent it,
where it is going, and what sort of priority it might require, as signified by the type of post-
age paid. See U.S. Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The data
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and classify the traffic passing through the network at a more detailed con-
tent level, according to specifications determined by the network owner.'22
This classification mechanism permits the network to automatically regu-
late the conditions for network traffic, including controlling bandwidth
allocations, differentiating quality of service, charging for individually
metered services and access rights, and identifying "premium" traffic for
preferred treatment through the network.'23
Industry leaders in networking technology products vaunt the capabilities
DPI and similar technologies offer to the vertically-integrated company
seeking to maximize profit across all consumer service offerings. 2 4 One
marketing document is illustrative:
With the Internet becoming the main channel for combined data, voice and video ser-
vices communication for both residential and business subscribers, the quality avail-
able by using the Internet's inherent "best effort" approach does not satisfy customer
expectations. In order for carriers to develop premium surcharges for these new pre-
mium services, it is necessary to clearly identify and manage network traffic. 1
25
Simply stated, the ability to packet-discriminate, coupled with the lack of
regulatory incentive to protect the public interest,126 provides network op-
inspected in deep-packet inspection is analogous to reading the contents inside the letter in
order to make decisions as to whether to deliver the letter at all, and, if so, with what prior-
ity.
122 See Deep Packet Inspection, supra note 120.
123 Cisco SYSTEMS, DEPLOYING PREMIUM SERVICES USING CISCO SERVICE CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.democraticmedia.org/PDFs/CiscoPremiumServices.pdf (discuss-
ing the abilities permitted by the use of deep packet inspection technology solutions).
124 See the Center for Digital Democracy Web site for industry white papers and other
documents extolling the benefits of deep packet inspection, particularly for the vertically-
integrated network company that seeks to promote its own content and applications over
those offered by third parties. Center for Digital Democracy,
http://www.democraticmedia.org/issues/netneutrality.htm.
125 ALLOT COMMUNICATIONS, INC., SERVICE CONTROL SOLUTION BENEFITS FOR
CARRIERS, available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/PDFs/AllotControl.pdf (emphasis
added). According to the company's website, "Allot solutions apply deep packet inspection
(DPI) technology to transform broadband pipes into smart networks. This creates the visi-
bility and control vital to manage applications and services, guarantee quality of service
(QoS), contain operating costs and maximize revenue." Allot Communications,
http://www.allot.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1 &Itemid=3 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2006); see also Tim Wilson, Allot Goes Deep on Packets, DARK READING,
June 7, 2006, http://www.darkreading.comdocument.asp?doc_id=96771 ("[Allot's traffic
management appliance] lets service providers inspect, identify, and analyze hundreds of
applications and protocols, track subscriber behavior, and prioritize traffic .... Using the
Allot product, service providers could conceivably track network behavior down to the end-
user level .... ).
126 By declaring DSL and cable modem services "information services" unburdened by
traditional public interest regulations, the FCC effectively removed incentives for private
firms to promote and protect the public interest in provision of broadband Internet. Because
the Internet Policy Statement is non-binding, there currently exist no regulatory require-
ments designed to ensure public interest concerns regarding broadband service provision.
See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. ("Brand V'), 545 U.S.
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erators the opportunity to realize returns on investment at the expense of
social welfare.127 As Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digi-
tal Democracy, explains, DPI is "the core of the new power held by phone
and cable companies." '28 The recent gush of public statements in which top
officials of such vertically-integrated communications providers as Veri-
zon and AT&T asserted their right to regulate what content is accessed
over proprietary network "pipes," by whom, and for how much,1 29 might
never have surfaced if such technology did not exist to implement the pro-
posed strategies.
IV. FAILURES OF OVERSIGHT AND ANALYSIS IN THE CURRENT
REGULATORY AND ANTITRUST REGIMES: THE CASE FOR
STATUTORY NET NEUTRALITY
Some telecommunications policy reform advocates encourage the adop-
tion of a paradigm of regulation relying more heavily on an antitrust
model. 30 But antitrust laws operate ex post, often after a competitor is
driven out of business, and impose a heavy burden on the wronged party to
prove anticompetitive behavior. Moreover, absent a demonstration of clear
competitive harm, antitrust jurisprudence directs forbearance from interfer-
ence or prohibition of the challenged business practice. 3'
Antitrust law relies on economic analyses to demonstrate whether a mar-
ket enjoys sufficient competition to withhold legal or regulatory interven-
tion. Network industries, however, often challenge traditional economic
model analyses. This Part argues that antirust laws and traditional market
competition analysis are insufficient as a regulator of Internet neutrality
largely because the underlying economic analyses fail to present an accu-
rate assessment of the true costs, benefits, and incentives inherent to net-
work industries. The government's flawed regulatory approach to competi-
tion concerns in convergent telecommunications industries, reliance on
antitrust and competition policy alone will fail to ensure a neutral Internet.
967, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005) (holding that information services are not bound by common
carrier regulations and the corresponding public interest concerns).
127 See Frischmann, supra note 17, at 1011.
128 Jeff Chester, The End of the Internet?, THE NATION, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester. Chester further notes that, while
[t]hese 'deep packet inspection' technologies are partly designed to make sure that the
Internet pipeline doesn't become so congested it chokes off the delivery of timely
communications[,]. . . video-driven material requires a great deal of Internet band-
width as it travels online, [and] phone and cable companies want to make sure their
television 'applications' receive preferential treatment on the networks they operate.
Id.
129 See sources cited, supra note 19.
130 See, e.g., Nuechterlein & Weiser, supra note 26.
131 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 1, 7
(2005) (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1963)).
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A. Failures of Imagination: the Verizon-MCI and SBC-AT&T Mergers
Comments submitted to the Commission by the American Antitrust Insti-
tute ("AAI") regarding the Verizon-MCI merger identified a major flaw in
the current approach to competitive market analysis, at least in the merger
context. 132 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines created by the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission are the standard by which horizon-
tal mergers are assessed for antitrust concerns.1 33 However, AAI explained,
the guidelines assume that product markets are distinct and separate, and
instruct competitive analyses within each relevant antitrust market rather
than an analysis that takes an industry-level approach of examining the
relationships between related product markets within the larger industry.3
By relying on the narrower approach, regulators fail to recognize the inher-
ent danger of monopoly leveraging in the vertically-integrated telecommu-
nications industry. The recently approved mergers of Verizon with MCI135
and SBC with AT&T 136 illustrate how this failure in competitive market
analysis results in the potential for leverage of bottleneck facilities to gain
or retain competitive advantage in related markets.
Significant portions of the FCC orders approving the mergers are de-
voted to analyses of the potential impact each merger would impart on the
Internet backbone market. 137 The "Internet backbone" refers to the physical
infrastructure interconnecting the networks over which the digitized pack-
ets of information of the Internet flow. 138 The approach and subsequent
determinations of the FCC with regard to the Internet backbone market's
control by the now-merged companies is a case study of the insufficiency
of traditional antitrust principles to evaluate competition in a vertically-
integrated, highly interdependent industry such as the converging tele-
communications, video, and information services industries.
The Commission focused on the impact of both the Verizon-MCI and the
SBC-AT&T mergers on the Internet backbone market solely in terms of
132 In re Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc., Applications For Approval Of
Transfer Of Control, Comments of the American Antitrust Institute, WC Docket 05-75, at 7
(May 9, 2005) [hereinafter AAI Comments], available at
http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/verizon-mci.html#record.
133 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (as re-
vised April 8, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
134 See AAI Comments, supra note 132, at 5.
135 In re Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc., Applications For Approval Of
Transfer Of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433 (Oct. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Verizon-MCI Merger Order].
136 In re SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications For Approval Of
Transfer Of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,290 (Oct. 31,
2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Merger Order].
1' See id. (H 108-144; Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 135, 1 109-144 (dis-
cussing Internet backbone competition in the context of the proposed mergers).
138 Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 135, W 110-12.
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effect on competition within that distinct market' 39 and not, as urged by
some commentators, 40 in terms of the effects of vertical integration of
Internet backbone providers (MCI and AT&T) with "last-mile" monopo-
lists' 4 1 (Verizon and SBC). In other words, third parties argued for an ap-
proach rejecting the traditional "silo" regulation model in which each
communications service is treated as if it existed in isolation from other
services. 141
Numerous commentators in both dockets called upon the Commission to
approach the Internet backbone competition analysis more holistically,
arguing that by focusing solely on the issue of competition between back-
bone providers, the Commission was ignoring the impacts of Internet
backbone concentration on the vast range of industries that rely on the
backbone for the delivery of their services and content to the market. '1
Many of the concerns raised in the comments centered on the creation of
market conditions to permit or encourage discrimination against third-party
Internet traffic through prioritization of proprietary packets '--a practice
contrary to net neutrality principles in general, and specifically contrary to
the principles in the Commission's own Policy Statement. 145 In response,
the Commission noted that,
while the merged entity may have an incentive to prioritize its own traffic using queu-
ing or other such differentiated service mechanisms, by recent measures significant ex-
cess capacity remains on backbone networks. Thus, in the absence of affirmative ef-
139 Much of the Internet backbone market competition and concentration analysis within
the approval Orders is redacted, so it is difficult to assess the exact figures upon which the
Commission made its decisions. See id. at Appendix E. However, referenced comments and
declarations indicate that while the merged companies' market power would likely fall short
of the level at which the Department of Justice determined would create monopoly power in
the Internet backbone market, the post-merger firms would enjoy two of the top five posi-
tions in the Tier 1 market. See, e.g., In re SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp.
Applications For Approval Of Transfer Of Control, Declaration of Marius Schwartz, WC
Docket No. 05-65, IN 20-26, available at http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/sbc-
att.html#appdocs.
140 See In re Verizon Communications and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Petition to Deny of EarthLink, Inc. and Request for Adjustment to the
Schedule, WC Docket No. 05-75, at 7-8 (May 9, 2005), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/verizon-mci.html#record.
41 "Last mile," or "local loop," refers to the telecommunications carrier's physical wires
or cables connecting the individual user premises to the nearest central circuit switch. They
are bottleneck facilities and, because of cost, are difficult for competitors to duplicate, re-
sulting in a monopoly market structure. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 33.
142 See Thierer, supra note 28, at 280 ("The traditional vertical 'silo' model of com-
munications industry regulation views each industry sector as a distinct set of entities
that do not interact and which should be regulated under different principles.").
143 See, e.g., AAI Comments, supra note 132.
144 See Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 135, T 140 and accompanying notes;
SBC-AT&TMerger Order, supra note 136, 1 141 and accompanying notes.
145 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 111, T 4.
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forts to degrade a competitor's traffic, queuing and packet prioritization is likely to
yield only very small increases in latency and packet loss in many cases.146
With this statement, the FCC asserted its belief that excess capacity on
the Internet backbone would mitigate any possibility of anticompetitive
leveraging of bottleneck facilities through packet discrimination. The
Commission also rejected commenter claims that the mergers would dra-
matically alter peering arrangements 147 among Tier 1148 backbone providers
and causing a fundamental shift that could force smaller, lower tier net-
work providers out of business. 49
In the end, the Commission determined that the non-binding promises
made by the merging companies to maintain public information about their
peering and traffic management policies, and to refrain from packet or traf-
fic discrimination of any sort, would suffice to ease any concerns raised.1
50
The Commission did not propose enforcement mechanisms which might
be invoked should the merged entities renege on these promises, nor did
the Commission anticipate the possibility that such nefarious conduct
might easily occur without detection. In a final measure underscoring the
Commission's lack of concern over the possibility of discriminatory Inter-
net traffic practices, the few meager non-discrimination merger conditions
the Commission did impose are scheduled to end in November 2007.'15
B. Antitrust Laws are Insufficient Deterrents to Discrimination
Harold Feld, senior vice president of the Media Access Project, recently
observed:
146 Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 135, 142 (internal citations omitted).
147 In a peering arrangement, two Internet backbone providers of roughly equal size
agree to hand-off to each other the traffic originating on one backbone network for delivery
to a point on the other's network. Because these arrangements are mutually beneficial, they
rarely involve an exchange of money. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 132.
148 Internet backbone providers whose global networks are of such scale and capacity
that they have no need to purchase transit services from other backbone providers are con-
sidered "Tier L." Id. at 133.
149 See Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 135, 128; SBC-AT&T Merger Order,
supra note 136, 129; see also In re SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applica-
tions For Approval of Transfer Of Control, Opposition of Broadwing Communications,
LLC, and SAWIS Communications Corporation, WC Docket No. 05-65 (Apr. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/sbc-att.htn-d#record.
150 See Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 136, 109; SBC-AT&T Merger Order,
supra note 134, 108.
151 See Verizon-MCI Merger Order, supra note 135, app. G; SBC-AT&T Merger Order,
supra note 136, app. F; see also Arshad Mohammed, The Titans of Telecom Face Off,
Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 2006, at B 1 ("As a condition of approval for both the Verizon-MCI and
SBC-AT&T mergers last year, the companies agreed not to impose restrictions on Internet
traffic, which in effect would enable some programs to work better than others. That provi-
sion sunsets two years after the close of those mergers.").
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Anyone taking a serious look at the track record on antitrust in network environments
understands why antitrust doesn't cut it. As I have observed before, Netscape won its
antitrust action against [Microsoft]. While no doubt providing some moral satisfaction,
it did little to restore Netscape's fortunes or restore the benefits of browser competition
to consumers.152
Even with its reminder of the unfortunate effects of a long-fought
litigation, Feld's observation presumes that a network firm today could
raise an antitrust claim sufficient to triumph over a rogue dominant player.
Current antitrust laws purport to serve as a deterrent to discriminatory and
predatory behavior by dominant firms, but often in fact serve to bolster
dominant players through a litigation system which demands a non-
uniform case-by-case adjudication, a lengthy fact-finding procedure, and
an adversarial process which can undermine business models, endangering
a litigant's economic success while it seeks relief through litigation. 153
Furthermore, recent precedent indicates that once-reliable doctrines such as
the essential facilities doctrine are no longer available as foundations for
antitrust actions. At the same time, economic theory has not yet infiltrated
the courts to permit a finding on whether vertical foreclosure is a viable
antitrust claim in network industries.
1. Essential Facilities Doctrine
An essential facility is a facility over which a monopolist controls access
and which is not easily duplicated by competitors but necessary for their
success. 54 Although a monopolist by definition does not normally "share"
its facilities, an antitrust concern arises where there is opportunity to "ex-
tend monopoly power from one stage of production to another, and from one
market into another."'' 55 The "essential facilities doctrine"'156 obliges firms that
control such a facility to make it available to rivals and complementary firms
on non-discriminatory terms, 157 and imposes liability158 where a failure to
152 Harold Feld, Why Antitrust Doesn't Cut It for NN (But Why Google has to Pretend),
Public Knowledge Policy Blog (July 5, 2006, 5:34 pm),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/511.
,53 See James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting
It, 35 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 15, 19 (2003).
154 "To be 'essential' a facility need not be indispensable; it is sufficient if duplication of
the facility would be economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handi-
cap on potential market entrants." Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir.
1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
155 MCI Commc'ns. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).
156 See Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992-93 ("The essential facility doctrine, also called the 'bot-
tleneck principle,' states that 'where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be
competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair terms. It is
illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the scarce facility."' (quoting A.D. NEALE, THE
ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (2d ed., 1970)).
157 MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132.
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provide such access demonstrates an unlawful use of monopoly power
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
159
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an
electrical utility had illegally monopolized an essential facility in violation
of the Sherman Act by refusing to deal through interconnection and whole-
sale agreements.' 60 Otter Tail Power denied competitors interconnection to
its electric power supply and distribution, thereby foreclosing competition
in wholesale sales.16 ' Although the power generation and distribution net-
work is never explicitly referred to as an "essential facility," the Court in
Otter Tail Power Co. implicitly adopted the rationale later explicated by
the 7th Circuit in MCI v. AT&T to impose liability under the essential fa-
cilities doctrine. 62 It follows that a broadband network provider who de-
nies a third-party content or VolP provider access to its subscribers in or-
der to preserve its market power is also illegally monopolizing an essential
facility. 163 Because most Internet users access the Internet through a single
provider, that provider has a monopoly over the consumer's Internet ex-
perience. Furthermore, because the vast majority of United States markets
have two or fewer broadband network access providers, those providers
control an essential facility through which consumers access content.164
158 "[F]our elements [are] necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities
doctrine: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility." Id., at 1132-33
(citing Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992-93).
159 "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Once monopoly power is proven, a § 2 violation oc-
curs where that power is used to "'to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advan-
tage, or to destroy a competitor."' Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992) (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
160 "Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose
competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of
the antitrust laws." Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973).
161 See id.
162 Id. at 378 (comparing the difficulty faced by competitors in duplicating the facilities
to the relative ease with which Otter Tail Power could interconnect and resell the power to
competitors, and concluding that Otter Tail Power's refusals were solely to preserve its
monopoly); accord. MCI Commc'ns. Corp., 708 F.2d at 1133. Holding AT&T liable for
illegally denying access to its essential facility, the 7th Circuit found that "Otter Tail pro-
vide[d] an analogy to the instant problem," and applied the analysis employed in that case
to the dispute between MCI and AT&T. Id.
163 Robert Pitofsky, et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 447 (2002) (citing Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. at 377-79).
164 PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, RURAL BROADBAND INTERNET USE 2 (2006),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP_.Rural Broadband.pdf (finding that 90% of consumers
have two or fewer choices in broadband providers).
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Unfortunately, the essential facilities antitrust doctrine is an inadequate
deterrent to discriminatory behavior by broadband network operators be-
cause it is not an independent cause of action.'65 Moreover, it is not a doc-
trine specifically recognized by the Supreme Court, although it has been
adopted by a majority of the lower federal courts and incorporated without
name by the Supreme Court in the past. 66 In order to prevail on an antitrust
claim, a competitor must assert a claim of unlawful monopolization under
the Sherman Act, 167 with the preclusion of access to the "essential facility"
as the supporting fact. It is well-settled that monopolization gained through
lawful means is not illegal under antitrust law. 68 Unless control of the fa-
cility confers monopoly power that is being used in a manner that is per se
illegal, the essential facilities doctrine offers no relief. Given that the
broadband facility provider market is not considered to be monopolized, as
evidenced by the Department of Justice and the FCC's approval of mergers
between major broadband network providers, SBC-AT&T and Verizon-
MCI, with no divestiture requirements, 69 a claim of illegal exertion of mo-
nopoly power would be very difficult to prove.
165 See Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The
,essential facilities' doctrine is not an independent cause of action, but rather a type of mo-
nopolization claim.").
66 See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP ("Trinko"), 540
U.s. 398, 410-11 (2004) ("This conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be
established law the 'essential facilities' doctrine crafted by some lower courts .... We
have never recognized such a doctrine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to
repudiate it here."); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428
(1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court has
never adopted the essential facilities doctrine). But cf Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985) (acknowledging the existence of the
"essential facilities" doctrine, but declining to analyze its relevance to the instant case).
Nevertheless, the Court has in numerous instances applied the principles of the essen-
tial facilities doctrine in antitrust cases in which there is an alleged refusal to deal. See
generally Pitofsky, et al., supra note 161, for a discussion of applications of the princi-
ples of the "essential facilities doctrine" in Supreme Court decisions since 1912.
167 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The offense of monopolization has two elements: '(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."') (quoting United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
168 "The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monop-
oly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system...
. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct." Trinko,
540 U.S. at 407; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). A
monopoly is illegal only where the monopolist also demonstrates "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Id.
169 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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2. Vertical Foreclosure and Refusal to Deal
Vertical foreclosure is the exclusion of competitors from a sub-market by
a dominant firm who refuses to sell to sub-rivals access to an essential fa-
cility or "bottleneck."'' 70 Economists and courts have long dismissed anti-
trust claims based on vertical foreclosure for the simple reason that classi-
cal economic theory presumes that no firm would willingly refuse sales,
even temporarily, as a strategy to achieve dominance in a vertically-related
market in the distant future. 7 ' New economic theory challenges this belief
and points toward an opposite conclusion: owners of a bottleneck facility
may actually find tremendous incentives to refuse to deal with vertical
input providers, and by doing so may in fact enhance existing market
domination in the bottleneck market.172 In the presence of economic incen-
tives to discriminate, regulation to preserve net neutrality is crucial. How-
ever, this theory has yet to be recognized by the courts and therefore verti-
cal foreclosure law does not offer a viable deterrent to exclusive behavior.
C. Market Economics Are an Insufficient Control: Concentrated, Verti-
cally-Integrated Networked Markets Create Incentives to Discriminate
The problem of competition among traditional cable and telephone mo-
nopolies is complex. On the one hand, the deregulatory spirit guiding eco-
nomic regulation in the United States for the past quarter of a century has
realized its goal: the elimination of state-sanctioned monopolists in favor
of a more competitive landscape. 73 However, the nature of network indus-
tries necessarily implicates concentration and vertical integration, eviscer-
ating idealistic visions of multiple telecommunications, video and broad-
band providers in every market. 74 Furthermore, whereas traditional market
economics teaches that monopolistic and oligopolistic industries usually do
not present incentives to discriminate against providers of complementary
services, the economics of networked industries and their increasing verti-
cal integration changes the equation.
170 Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-Grounding the Refusal To Deal Doctrine, 66 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 821, 823 (2005).
171 Id. at 823-24.
172 See discussion of incentives to discriminate infra Part IV.C.3.
173 See Eli M. Noam, Deregulation and Market Concentration: An Analysis of Post-1996
Consolidations, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 539 (2006) (discussing competition in telecommunica-
tions, media, and Internet industries after the 1996 Act).
174 Id. at 540-41 (explaining that the only viable response to instability and competition
in these industries is concentration).
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1. Nature of Network Industries
Network industries are those in which network effects, economies of
scale, switching costs and lock-in, and standards have tremendous influ-
ence on the way in which the market behaves.'75 Network effects are the
phenomenon in which the average value of a network to current and poten-
tial customers increases dramatically as the size of the network increases.
176
This is true in telecommunications, where a single telephone has no value
unless connected to a network linking other telephones; 177 in cable televi-
sion, because a cable operator needs the appropriate revenue and audience
demographics to acquire programming, which then attracts more subscrib-
ers and greater revenue; 178 and the Internet, which benefits from both the
value of communication and the audience for content development.
79
Network effects often create an occurrence in the market known as "tip-
ping," an effect of positive feedback forces common to network indus-
tries. 8 ' Positive feedback is the propensity of firms in a network market,
once on a trajectory, to continue on that trajectory.' 8' In such a scenario,
consumers select and perpetuate larger networks based on the value im-
bued by network effects, thereby squeezing out lesser competitors.' 82 This
175 For an overview of network economics and networked industries, see generally CARL
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK
ECONOMY (1998).
176 Network effects are exhibited in "markets in which the value that consumers place on
a good increases as others use the good." Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Im-
plications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479,481 (1998).
171 "[A]n individual consumer's demand to use (and hence her benefit from) the tele-
phone network. . . increases with the number of other users on the network whom she can
call or from whom she can receive calls." Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Anti-
trust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 8 (2001); see also Lemley &
McGowan, supra note 169, at 488-89 ("[O]wning the only telephone ... in the world
would be of little benefit because it could not be used to communicate with anyone. The
value of the telephone ... one has already purchased increases with each additional pur-
chaser....").
178 See BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO TELEVISION 121-22 (1999).
179 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 176, at 560. Internet network effects are dem-
onstrated in "the positive value placed on the ability to contact other people via the
Internet and from the access to information from a wide variety of different sources."
Id.
180 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("In markets
characterized by network effects, one product or standard tends towards dominance, be-
cause 'the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the num-
ber of other agents consuming the good."' (quoting Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Net-
work Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 424 (1985))).
181 This trajectory can be a "virtuous cycle," whereby the success of a firm feeds on
itself, or the trajectory can become a "vicious cycle," in which a failing firm continues to
weaken. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 175, at 175-76.
182 See id. at 176-77; see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49 ("Once a product or standard
achieves wide acceptance, it becomes more or less entrenched.").
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results in a concentrated or "tipped" market in which new competitive en-
try is essentially impossible. 8 3 Because the value of the network is inextri-
cably linked to the number of users with whom each consumer may com-
municate, or the number and variety of complimentary and compatible
goods and services, network effects create demand-side economies of
scale. Larger networks will continue gaining market share at the expense of
smaller competitors until the market tips toward the domination of a single
firm or a very small number of competing firms, 84 known as an oligop-
oly. 8
5
Network industries are also defined by substantial supply-side economies
of scale. Whereas in demand-side economies of scale, revenues increase as
the demand scale increases, supply-side economies demonstrate an average
cost decrease with scale.8 6 Network industries almost always exhibit tre-
mendous fixed costs (the cost to build the physical network), with minimal
marginal costs (the cost to add an additional user to the network, for exam-
ple). 8 7 As a result, network firms will see a declining average cost curve
over time; yet, because of network effects, the firm will also enjoy increas-
ing returns to scale in terms of revenues as demand increases over the ma-
jority of the downward cost curve. 88 This cost structure has implications
for product pricing and on the ability of new entrants to compete. First, the
combination of demand-side and supply-side economies of scale results in
"price-making," or the pricing of products at the discretion of the producer
rather than the market. 8 9 Firms with such discretion may engage in preda-
tory pricing (pricing below marginal cost) in order to eliminate smaller
183 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 175, at 176-77.
184 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMPUTER SCI. AND TELECOMM. BD., supra note 34, at
42 ("This tippiness of the Internet marketplace suggests a pattern of highly concentrated
markets and market leaders who greatly outdistance their competitors ... ").
185 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1120 (8th ed. 2004) ("[Oligopoly is the] control or
domination of a market by a few large sellers, creating high prices and low output
similar to those found in a monopoly.").
186 See Hal R. Varian, Economics of Information Technology,
htp://www.ischool.berkeley.edul-hallPapers/mattioli/mattioli.pdf, at 32.7 See id. at 24 ("[M]any information and technology-related businesses have cost struc-
tures with large fixed costs and small, or even zero, marginal costs."). See also Hannibal
Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access as Antitrust and Telecommunica-
tions Policy, 55 Am. U.L. REv. 1697, 1716 (2006) ("[T]he marginal and average total costs
of delivering broadband to the millionth user of an existing broadband network will tend to
be much lower than to the tenth user to a newly constructed network.").
188 Id. at 34 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of software).
189 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES,
REGULATION MISLED BY MISREAD THEORY: PERFECT COMPETITION AND COMPETITION-
IMPOSED PRICE DISCRIMINATION 5 (2005), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1257 (asserting that, while it is well-
established that firms with high sunk or fixed costs will price-discriminate, firms might also
be forced to do so in competitive markets).
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rivals from the market.' 90 Then, as their market power' becomes en-
trenched, firms are able to raise prices well above cost because, in the ab-
sence of viable competition, traditional pressures on price are non-
existent. 
9 2
The inherent pressure to retain market dominance, or at least the ability
to enjoy demand-side economies of scale, causes some network firms to
merge horizontally to capitalize on a larger network of users and the corre-
lated increased value of the network. 193 As the market reaches equilibrium,
either naturally or through regulatory or antitrust conditions, firms must
find creative ways to continue to retain value in order to retain pricing lev-
els that allow sufficient investment returns. Because that ability is inexora-
bly tied to demand-side economies of scale, network operators also are
enticed to integrate vertically with applications and content input firms in
order to satisfy current user demand and to protect the firm's position in
the market.
190 "A predatory pricing scheme is 'the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the
purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses through higher
profits earned in the absence of competition."' Michael L. Denger, et al., Predatory Pricing
and Practices, 1526 PLI/Corp 233, 237 (2006) (quoting AD/SAT v. Assoc. Press, 920 F.
Supp. 1287, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 181 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 1999)).
191 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1120 (8th ed. 2004). Market power confers on a firm
the "ability to reduce output and raise prices above the competitive level-specifically,
above marginal cost-for a sustained period, and to make a profit by doing so. In antitrust
law, a large amount of market power may constitute monopoly power." Id.
192 The United States Department of Justice described the scenario in which a network
market tips and the dominant firm is able to control pricing thusly:
[w]hen a single network grows to a point at which it controls a substantial share of the
total Internet end user base and its size greatly exceeds that of any other network, net-
work externalities may cause a reversal of its previous incentives to achieve efficient
interconnection arrangements with its rival networks. In this context, degrading the
quality or increasing the price of interconnection with smaller networks can create ad-
vantages for the largest network in attracting customers to its network .... Once the
market begins to "tip," connecting to the dominant network becomes even more im-
portant to competitors. This, in turn, enables the dominant network to further raise its
rivals' costs, thereby accelerating the tipping effect . . . Ultimately, once rivals have
been eliminated or reduced to "customer status," the dominant network can raise
prices to users of its own network beyond competitive levels. Once this occurs, restor-
ing the market to a competitive state often requires extraordinary means, including
some form of government regulation.
Complaint 41, United States v. WorldCom, Inc. and Sprint Corp. (D.D.C. June 27, 2000).
'93 See Noam, supra note 173, at 540-41. Noam explains that "low marginal costs, high
fixed costs, inelastic demand, positive network externalities, lags in supply, disinvestment
and regulation, and a Wall Street short-term perspective..." promote industry concentra-
tion, effected by horizontal mergers. Id. See also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24,
at 423.
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2. From Monopoly to Competition to Oligopoly
Both telecommunications and cable television were the products of mo-
nopoly regimes. 94 Telecommunications provided by AT&T were regulated
as a "natural" monopoly spanning the majority of the United States. Cable
was subjected to less federal oversight but beholden to state public utility
commissions for franchise rights, which usually granted a single cable firm
monopoly rights for specific geographic areas.' 95 The relevant product
markets were distinct (no one was likely to confuse a phone for a televi-
sion) and the facilities for delivery of the respective services were mark-
edly different.19 6 The advent of the Internet during the 1990s as a commer-
cial offering for public use 97 began to blur these distinctions. Cable and
telecommunications companies encountered a prospect unprecedented in
the "silo" regulatory era: cross-industry competition in service provision-
here, the provision of Internet access. Alas, while proliferation of broad-
band Internet access has occurred, the numbers of providers, and consumer
choice in providers, has fallen short of the ideal. In 2006, according the
Pew Internet and American Life Project, "90% of [all residential broad-
band] subscribers have cable modems or DSL, with cable and DSL split-
ting that market share."' 98 Thus, broadband Internet provision across the
United States as a whole is a highly concentrated,'99 oligopolistic industry,
with the majority of local markets served by a monopoly or duopoly of
firms. 200
194 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 12-13.
195 See discussion of cable regulation, supra Part III.B.4.
196 Traditionally, telecommunications services were provided via copper wires strung or
laid between homes and business and a central circuit switch. See NUECHTERLEIN &
WEISER, supra note 24, at 32-36. Cable television was historically provided over coaxial
cables connecting homes and buildings to a central office from which programming was
distributed. It; see also DAVID GARBIN & JOSEPH PECAR, THE MCGRAw-HILL NEW
TELECOM FACTBOOK 364 (2d. ed. 2000). Copper telecommunications wires lacked the ca-
pacity to distribute video services, and technologies for the delivery of real-time voice were
not advanced enough to reliably transmit telecommunications over coaxial cable as late as
the year 2000. Id. at 355.
197 The National Science Foundation ("NSF') developed the NSFNET in the 1980s,
hoping to replicate the success of ARPANET to connect universities across the United
States; the NSFNET rapidly expanded to become the first nationwide Internet backbone. In
1993, the NSF began to privatize portions of the network, until a complete hand off to
commercial entities occurred in 1998. See National Science Foundation, A Brief History of
NSF and the Internet, August 13,
2003,http://www.nsf.gov/news/news summ.jsp?cntnid= 103050.
198 PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 2.
199 See Travis, supra note 187, at 1721 ("[T]he typical local broadband market has an
HHI concentration level of 5,000, three times what the Department of Justice considers to
be highly concentrated.").
200 See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 2; see also Travis, supra
note 187, at 1721 ("Many consumers have only one broadband choice to make: between a
single DSL and a single cable broadband provider.").
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3. Incentives to Discriminate
In a perfect economic world, network operators and consumers would
share the same goal for the Internet: a neutral platform that supports the
emergence of innovative and desirable content and applications. 20 1 Accord-
ingly, network operators focused on long-term results will recognize that
the more robust the availability of content and applications, the greater
demand and use of the network, and the greater the ability to capitalize on
that demand. The idea that dominant firms will welcome rather than ex-
clude independent producers of complementary products is known as the
"internalization of complementary efficiencies." 202 Thus, the "network
owner's natural instinct [will] be to open up its network to all content and
applications providers, because doing so [will] maximize the value of its
network and thus maximize the amount that it [can] charge for network
access."203 Network operators should therefore find the benefits of inclu-
sion so advantageous as to adhere to net neutrality principles voluntarily,
eliminating the need for prescriptive regulation.20 4 However, network op-
erators often implement limits and discriminatory policies against emerg-
ing applications because the firms are focused on protectionist short-term
gains associated with stifling competition and limiting network capacity.205
Recent economic analysis by Barbara van Schewick expands the bases
on which network operators might justify such conduct, positing that the
nature of network industries creates tremendous incentives to discriminate
even in the face of competition.2 o Van Schewick notes that "[ilt is usually
assumed that competition in the market for Internet services will restrict a
network operator's ability and incentive to discriminate against independ-
ent content, portals or applications.20 7 In other words, a network operator
depends on the existence of varied and abundant content and services in
201 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination. 2 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142 (2003).
202 See van Schewick, supra note 51, at 5; see also Farrell & Weiser, supra note 49, at
100-105 for a more thorough discussion of the internalization of complementary efficien-
cies concept in the Internet industry.
203 See Yoo, supra note 22, at 1888.
204 See Yoo, supra note 130, at 7.
205 Wu, supra note 201, at 195; see also In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Ex Pane Letter of Tim Wu & Law-
rence Lessig, CS Docket No. 02-52 (August 22, 2003) [hereinafter Wu & Lessing Letter],
available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=65146838
84. Wu & Lessig explain that prior concerns regarding cable companies' restrictions on
customers use of Virtual Private Networks highlighted "a problematic tendency: the restric-
tion of new and innovative applications that broadband operators see as either unimportant,
a competitive threat, or a chance to make money." Id.
206 See van Schewick, supra note 51, at 25-27.
207 Id. at 26.
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order to generate demand among consumers for his conduit service. °8 He
would therefore be disinclined to discriminate against those offerings be-
cause a competitor conduit service could lure customers away by offering a
less-, or non-discriminatory service. This assumption supports the policy
approach that "fostering facilities-based competition, i.e., increased com-
petition between operators of different physical networks, will mitigate a
network provider's ability and incentive to discriminate., 20 9 This assump-
tion is remarkably similar to the assumptions employed by the FCC in con-
cluding that the amount of excess infrastructure capacity in the Internet
backbone market would mitigate discrimination by the post-merger firms
AT&T and Verizon.21°
Van Schewick argues that such assumptions are incorrect, primarily be-
cause they presume a traditional, "one monopoly rent" market structure in
which there is only one monopoly profit source in a market and therefore
no incentives to discriminate or exclude rivals in complementary, adjacent
markets.2t In network industries, increasing returns to scale in fact offer
incentives similar to those in antitrust tying scenarios, in which comple-
mentary products allow the single firm to collect in excess of the one mo-
nopoly rent where additional revenue streams may be associated with the
complementary product.2 2 For example, a company selling monopolized
broadband Internet service bundled with a portal service could, per the
"one monopoly rent" theory, only collect one monopoly price for the bun-
dled service; because the company controls the underlying facility and can
therefore charge the monopoly price for access to it, monopolizing the
complementary portal market would not offer additional profit. However,
if the portal is supported by an outside revenue stream like advertising, the
company has an incentive to capture the portal market in order to garner
the additional revenue stream. This example demonstrates that the broad-
band provider may reap monopoly profits in the bundled service market as
well as the market for portal advertisers.
There is an argument to be made that vertical integration enabling a firm
to realize multiple monopoly profits is simply a demonstration of superior
business acumen, and not behavior to be maligned. As Tim Wu points out,
208 See Yoo, supra note 22, at 1888.
209 See van Schewick, supra note 51, at 26.
210 See discussion supra Part V.A.
211 van Schewick, supra note 51, at 5, 26. A proponent of the one monopoly rent theo-
rem, Christopher Yoo argues that "owners of bottleneck facilities have [no] systematic
incentives to expand into vertically related markets for the simple reason that there is only
one monopoly rent generated by any vertical chain of production and a monopolist can
extract the entirety of that rent without vertically integrating simply by charging the mo-
no[oly price for the bottleneck facility." Yoo, supra note 22, at 1888.
See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 176, at 496 ("Increasing returns also raise ques-
tions about the possibility of effectively leveraging a monopoly from one market to another,
an argument most commonly associated with antitrust tying claims.")
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even monopolists theoretically have an incentive to minimize input
costs.213 If a firm elects to internalize a complementary function for cost
and efficiency reasons, should the firm be penalized for failure to offer
equal access to less efficient competitors? The problem with this approach
is that it is nearly impossible to determine, without the sort of disclosures
revealed in litigation, that a firm has engaged in exclusion strictly for effi-
ciency rather than for leveraging reasons.2"4 Moreover, exclusion of rivals,
vertical and horizontal, is usually believed to require monopoly power.
The traditional definition of monopoly includes the ability to exclude ri-
vals from the market.215 In the Internet industry, however, technology pro-
vides the ability to exercise exclusionary tactics with or without monopoly
power, offering companies in competitive markets the ability to exclude
rivals in a way never before possible.2 6 Through excluding a rival's com-
plementary product from access to the network provider's customers, the
network provider can increase the sales and the perceived value of its own
complementary product. 27 "The exclusion of rivals may protect the net-
work provider's competitive position in the market for Internet services,
even if it faces competition in this market. Such an incentive may occur
when an Internet transport provider offers proprietary content and applica-
tions exclusively to its transport customers. 2 8 Even more disturbing, ex-
clusionary tactics appear to have few negative repercussions for network
providers. Theoretically, the existence of competing firms in a market in-
creases the costs of exclusionary behavior to that individual firm. 219 In a
competitive environment, the incentive for consumers to switch from a
provider engaged in exclusionary tactics is expected to discipline errant
firms.220 In the market for broadband network provision, however, several
factors alter this typical result.
The first factor is the general lack of competition among broadband net-
work providers in the United States.22' The majority of Americans who do
enjoy a choice among broadband providers have only two options: DSL
213 See Tim Wu, Broadband: A User's Guide, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 86
(2004).
214 See id.
215 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The Su-
preme Court defines monopoly power as 'the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion."' (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956))).
216 See supra Part II.D. for a discussion of the technological means available to exclude
rivals.
217 van Schewick, supra note 5 1, at 27.
218 Id. at 29.
219 See id. at 30.
220 See Yoo, supra note 22, at 1888 ("The failure of early proprietary services provided
by America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy attests to the market's ability to discipline
network owners who attempt to impose closed architectures on consumers who prefer open
ones.").
221 See PEW INTERNET & AM. LFE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 2.
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and cable.222 Due to a difference in capacity and bit-rates, however, DSL
and cable are arguably not adequate substitutes. 223 High-bandwidth con-
sumers-people who dedicate much of their Internet usage to high-
bandwidth content and applications such as streaming media and online
gaming-are not likely to perceive a DSL product offering a maximum
download speed of less than 10 megabytes per second as an acceptable
substitute for cable modem service offering download speeds that are three
times faster.224 Because "consumers perceive cable modem service as being
premium,' '225 high-bandwidth cable customers in particular will have a high
threshold for tolerating exclusionary behavior by the network operator. The
amount of exclusionary conduct tolerated by the consumer illustrates the
high switching costs inherent in the broadband network provider market.
Second, even assuming healthy competition, exclusionary conduct by a
network operator, particularly one with a large, established customer base,
can drive the producers of the excluded application or content from the
market entirely.226 Once the producers of the excluded content are no
longer in operation, the consumer has no incentive to switch network pro-
viders because the desired, excluded product no longer exists.227 For exam-
ple, should a large network service provider such as Comcast desire to
eliminate a rival to their nascent VoIP offering through exclusion, there is
minimal threat of customer leakage. This is both because the alternative is
a less-than-perfect substitute and because the rival VolP firm's inability to
access the vast network of Comcast subscribers (and the positive network
effects associated with such access) could diminish the viability of the firm
to the point of bankruptcy. The relatively low cost of such exclusionary
behavior 228 is compelling for firms seeking to minimize the burdens of
222 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
223 For two products to be competitors, they must be seen as substitutes, meaning that a
consumer could select either one for a particular use. Cable and DSL Internet access are not
perfect substitutes. Robert Marich, Cable Modem Vs. DSL: Rivals Side-Step Big Price Wars
So Far, KAGAN RESEARCH INSIGHTS, July 06, 2006,
http://www.kagan.com/ContentDetail.aspx?group=5&id=216.
224 See id. ("Cable systems have increased their download speeds to a maximum of 30
mbps . . . .Telephone-wire based digital subscriber lines (DSL) generally have slower
download speeds in the low-single-digits of Mbps . .
225 Id.
226 van Schewick, supra note 51, at 27.
227 Id. at 30.
228 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224 (1986). Exclusion by use
of code is less complicated and taxing than the traditional methods in which firms seek to
exclude rivals, thus the costs may be internalized. For example, "contracts for exclusionary
rights can have the effect of raising rivals' costs by restraining the supply of inputs avail-
able to rivals, thereby giving the purchaser power to raise prices in its output market." Id.
However, in order to achieve that result, the firm must first enter into long-term contracts
requiring negotiations, compromises and changes to business practices, all of which are
costly to the business (at least in the short-term) and raise the potential for public scrutiny
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high-bandwidth or high-volume exterior traffic on their network. The in-
centive to exclude is even greater when the excluding firm offers a product
which will gain market share in the absence of the excluded competing
product.
Finally, increasingly intelligent networks offer operators the ability to
discriminate against, rather than completely exclude, rivals.229 Technologi-
cal advancements such as DPI permit instantaneous detection of the type of
application or content attempting to traverse the network, and provide the
network operator the ability to deploy methods for allocating and deliver-
ing that traffic according to proprietary specifications.23 ° The incentives to
discriminate are even greater than the incentives for exclusion. Because
"discrimination works indirectly by changing the consumers' perception of
the quality of a rival's offering[,]" consumers are likely to assume the rival
offering is less desirable and may abandon its use without investigating the
true cause of the deterioration of service quality.23" ' The consumer is then
induced to embrace the competing product offered by the network operator
because it is believed to be of a higher quality.232 Discriminatory practices
are more insidious and therefore more detrimental to the market than direct
exclusion because the consumer does not perceive that her choice has been
restricted. 3 Where there is no perceived wrong, there is no incentive to
switch providers and no outcry to alert government or consumer groups to
foul play. As the network provider market grows increasingly concentrated
and vertically integrated, the incentive to capture monopoly profits at all
levels of the vertical hierarchy intensifies, 234 and the ability to employ dis-
crimination to achieve those goals without negative impact becomes all the
more enticing.
V. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Some have argued that addressing network neutrality through statute or
FCC action would create a solution in need of a problem.235 Indeed, Com-
and litigation. See id. Technological exclusion mechanisms place far fewer demands on the
business. See supra Part II.D.
229 See van Schewick, supra note 51, at 3 1.
230 See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.D.2.
231 See van Schewick, supra note 51, at 31.
232 Id.
233 id.
234 This is mostly a result of the fact that the cost to add a range of complementary ser-
vice subscriptions onto a current broadband subscription will be lower than finding and
adding an unfamiliar customer. The promise of customer retention is great, given the
switching costs and perceived lower quality of rival offerings. See supra Part III.C. 1.
235 See Amy Schatz & Anne Marie Squeo, Neutral Ground: As Web Providers' Clout
Grows, Fears Over Access Take Focus: FCC's Ruling Fuels Debate Between Broadband
Firnis and Producers of Content, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at AI ("'[Net neutrality legis-
lation is] a solution in search of a problem,' says Dan Brenner, senior vice president of law
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mission Chairman Kevin Martin told the Wall Street Journal in August,
2005, that there is no evidence that network owners are implementing con-
tent restrictions.236 The U.S. Internet Industry Association claimed, in a
2006 white paper arguing against net neutrality legislation, that "no dire
plans to choke off Internet access have been implemented, no consumers
have been injured, and none of the parties have announced programs (or
have any incentive to implement programs) that would be to the detriment
of the nation or its consumers. ' 237 Assertions that no problem currently
exists are immaterial where evidence of desire, incentive, and ability point
to a different conclusion. Nevertheless, opponents of net neutrality assume
that the market, bolstered by competition among broadband providers and
the ability for consumers to switch providers is sufficient to prevent anti-
competitive exclusion, and they disregard the insidiousness of discrimina-
238tory traffic management.
Whether discriminatory or exclusionary practices by network operators
can be rationalized or rejected based on competition theory or market eco-
nomics is irrelevant to the reality of industry conditions today. The ration-
ale for regulatory intervention in network neutrality may be found not in
explicit evidence of abusive or restrictive behavior of network operators,
but in the lack of such evidence. Technology now provides network opera-
tors with the means to implement exclusion and discrimination without the
knowledge of consumers or regulators. Absent flagrant and cognizable
conduct by which consumers and rival providers become aware of a dis-
crimination or exclusion, network providers could easily implement such
tactics undetected.239 Moreover, because the economic incentives for such
conduct are so great and the current penalties are meager to non-existent, it
is foolish to assume that the same companies publicly advocating rejection
and regulatory policy at the National Cable and Telecommunications Association."); see
also Ann Broache, Net Neutrality Field in Congress Gets Crowded, CNET NEws.coM, May
19, 2006, http://news.com.coff/2100-1028_3-6074564.html (quoting a BellSouth spokes-
man's assessment that net neutrality legislation would be a solution in search of a problem).
236 Schatz & Squeo, supra note 235, at Al. Chairman Martin also expressed his belief
that, even if there was a problem, the market would correct abuses. Id.
237 DAVID P. MCCLURE, U.S. INTERNEr INDUS. ASSN., NETWORK NEUTRALITY: PHANTOM
PROBLEM, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: A PRIMER FOR REGULATORS, LEGISLATORS AND THE
MEDIA ON 'NETWORK NEUTRALITY' 3 (2006), available at
http://www.usiia.org/pubs/NNPrimer.doc.
238 See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 27. Hazlett also opposes net neutrality regulation, argu-
ing that "[t]he [I]nternet is built, and grows, on the back of private property rights. Market
structures that nurture innovative entrants have not been imposed by 'design,' but have
spontaneously emerged from 'invisible hand' of self-interest." Id.; see also Randolph J.
May, A Better Idea For Net Neutrality, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://news.com.com2010-1028_3-6048882.html ("Adoption of a broad Net neutrality
prohibition will impose monopoly-era public-utility-style regulation on new broadband
services in an era characterized by competition.").
239 The blocking of VoIP traffic by Madison River is an example of detection of exclu-
sionary tactics by a rival. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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of net neutrality will suddenly elect against employing discrimination and
exclusion on their networks. Regardless, says James Suloweicki of the New
Yorker, "providers insist that they have no plans to block access or degrade
service to those who don't pay a premium rate. But if some companies are
getting better service, then all the others are getting worse service." 240
Some net neutrality regulation opponents stress that there are already
safeguards in place at the federal level to protect consumers, contending
that "the FCC or Congress will step in if incumbent networks are blocking
or discriminating in ways that consumers can observe.""24 Given the
previous reticence of these bodies to interfere with the Internet, it is
difficult to imagine the FCC or Congress swooping in to rescue the
consumer from such discrimination without a mandate.242 Furthermore, the
flaw in this argument is not only that it assumes the government will
intervene on behalf of the wronged consumer, but that the consumer is
only wronged if the discriminatory or exclusionary behavior is readily ob-
served. The premise ignores the possibility and, indeed, the probability,
that network operators will discriminate in a manner likely to go
undetected by the average consumer.
As part of an overall effort to rewrite or reform the Communications Act,
several bills have been proposed that address, among other issues, the con-
cern over net neutrality.243 For any net neutrality legislation to be effective,
Congress must ensure that it contains enforcement mechanisms to hold the
industry accountable, or risk leaving users of the Internet at the mercy of
undisclosed control by the owner-operators of the network. Because net-
work facilities operators currently are not required to disclose their packet
prioritization or routing preference policies, consumers could become cap-
tives of a regulated market--one artificially regulated by the corporations
themselves.
Detractors of net neutrality regulation argue that a truly robust, competi-
tive broadband market will emerge only if broadband network operators
are permitted to discriminate using models that vary the levels of access a
user is allowed, and by traffic discrimination.244 Thomas W. Hazlett, a
former FCC chief economist, contends that "no single [net neutrality] pol-
icy mandate, articulate or clumsy, would capture the efficiencies that
emerge from the trials and errors of the market."245 This theory ignores the
240 James Surowiecki, Net Losses, NEW YORKER, Mar. 20, 2006, at 74.
241 Mark Del Bianco, The Next Broadband Battleground, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 24,
2006, http://news.com.com/2010-1034_3-6052980.html.
242 See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
243 As of August 19, 2006, the 1 0 9 th Congress passed a bill in the House of Representa-
tives that addresses the issue of net neutrality, and the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation approved a bill absent net neutrality language to go to the full
Senate for vote.
244 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 22.
245 Hazlett, supra note 27.
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negative impact discriminatory and exclusionary tactics will have on com-
petition by discouraging investment, innovation, and entry.246 Furthermore,
Hazlett and others operate on the presumption that any net neutrality regu-
lation would necessarily involve prescriptive pricing models and unbun-
dling requirements, echoing problems with the 1996 Act.2"7
Extreme measures like prescriptive pricing, however, are unnecessary to
ensure net neutrality. Moreover, net neutrality does not inherently require
that network operators be precluded from devising product differentiation
tactics, such tiered subscription plans based on broadband speeds.248 These
strategies are currently employed by some DSL operators, in which differ-
ent levels of broadband access speeds are offered according to tiered price
plans.249 Net neutrality regulation can permit such reasonable differentia-
tion while prohibiting broadband providers from "tiering" content by giv-
ing their own content, or content from integrated or network-preferred pro-
viders, preferential treatment.250 Regulatory intervention and competition
are not mutually exclusive, and policies designed to protect the consumer
can, and should, also provide protection for legitimate competitive enter-
prise.
246 See Wu & Lessing Letter, supra note 205 (arguing that discrimination will actually
suppress competition among broadband networks, and will depress innovation and entry in
the applications and content markets).
247 Hazlett, supra note 27.
248 Tiered pricing plans, in which companies differentiate products according to maxi-
mum download and upload bit rates, should not be conflated with what some net neutrality
advocates call "access tiering." Lawrence Lessig explains that, "[b]y 'access-tiering,' I
mean any policy by network owners to condition content or service providers' right to pro-
vide content or service to the network upon the payment of some fee ... independent of
basic Internet access fees." Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 18 (testimony of Lawrence
Lessig), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf. Lessig describes
permissible discrimination in which consumers pay differentiated rates depending on the
speed of their Internet service as "consumer-tiering." Id.
249 Verizon, for example, offers two levels of DSL service for the home. Prices for each
level vary according to length of contract commitment, bundling of additional Verizon
services, etc., but generally increase commensurate with the connection speed. See Verizon
Online DSL, http://www22.verizon.com/ForHomeDSL/channels/dsl/packages/default.asp
(last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
250 See Adam L. Pennenberg, Internet Freeloaders: Should Google Have to Pay for
Bandwidth?, SLATE.COM, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2134397 ("By tagging
content, broadband providers would ensure that their own packets (or those from companies
paying them protection money) get preferential treatment and reach subscribers faster than
second-tier content."). Pennenberg proposes that the solution to net neutrality is a pay-for-
use system in which the flat-rate system of broadband access is replaced with billing based
on usage, similar to the system for cellular phones. Id. See also John Markoff, 'Neutrality'
is New Challenge for Internet Pioneer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006 (interviewing Tim Bern-
ers-Lee, who explains that charging more for high-bandwidth connectivity is not antithetical
to net neutrality).
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VI. PROPOSALS FOR NET NEUTRALITY
The need for federal guidance in the area of net neutrality is urgent. It
should not, however, be an invitation to burden a vigorous and innovative
industry with cumbersome restrictions, mandates and pricing mandates.
The 1996 Act is looked to by many as a prime example of the way in
which regulatory efforts to create ex post parity result in massive distor-
tions.25" ' Implementation of a regulatory framework that demands transpar-
ency and accountability without specific technical or managerial require-
ments can ensure continued normal market function while preserving the
robustly competitive and innovative nature of the Internet.
A. The Failures of Legislative Efforts to Address Net Neutrality
Comprehensive legislation addressing myriad telecommunications and
media concerns under consideration in 2006 is likely to fail before the end
of the 109th Congress precisely because of a lack of targeted net neutrality
language.252 However, the bills proposed in this session offer a blueprint
for net neutrality legislation in the 1 10th Congress. While it is clear that the
FCC has a history of Internet oversight, the reticence of Chairman Kevin
Martin to take initiative on the issue and the current uncertainty over the
precedent set by the Madison River intervention underscores the need for a
Congressional mandate to the FCC to regulate and enforce a neutral Inter-
net.
1. Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of
2006
In June, the House passed the Communications Opportunity, Promotion,
and Enhancement Act of 2006 ("COPE Act"), 53 a bill drafted to narrowly
address issues involving cable video franchising, the provision of commu-
nications services by municipalities, VoIP 911 services, unbundled broad-
band, and the development of wireless broadband devices.2 ' The legisla-
tion also addresses net neutrality, but only insofar as to grant the Commis-
sion authority to investigate and enforce violations of the principals identi-
251 Richard A. Epstein, What We Need is Regulatory Bed Rest, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Mar. 20, 2006, http://www.ft.com (search for "Regulatory Bed Rest"; then follow "Thomas
W. Hazlett: Neutering the Net" hyperlink).
252 Ann Broache, Net Neutrality Bill May Die This Year, CNET NEws.coM, Sept. 13,
2006, http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-6115016.html ("A rift over Net neutrality is the
No. 1 issue holding up a massive communications bill and could cause it to be derailed this
year .... ").
253 Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252,
109th Cong. (as passed by House, June 8, 2006).
2 4 See H.R. REP. No. 109-470, at 2 (2006).
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fled in the Internet Policy Statement on a case-by-case basis.2 15 Moreover,
the COPE Act explicitly denies the Commission "the authority to adopt or
implement rules or regulations regarding enforcement of the policy state-
ment and principles.'256
2. The Communications Act of 2006
Upon passage in the House, the COPE Act was referred to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, where it was sub-
stituted by an -amended bill, known as the Advanced Telecommunications
and Opportunities Reform Act, or the Communications Act of 2006."s
This bill is more sweeping in its reforms than the House bill,58 but, like the
House bill, also falls short of a true net neutrality mandate.
The Senate bill incorporates The Internet Consumer Bill of Rights Act of
2006,259 in which the Senate approved general principles by which the
Commission should conduct itself with regard to regulation of the Inter-
net26° and adopted a list of rights accorded to subscribers of Internet service
providers. 26' The enumerated rights generally stand to ensure that subscrib-
ers may use and access the applications and content of their choosing.262
Under this bill, the Commission is granted authority to devise a complaint
and enforcement procedure for consumer-reported violations. 263 Beyond
this explicit power, however, the Commission would be precluded from
promulgating any rules of its own regarding regulation of the Internet.2 64
The Senate Act fails to address the reality of net neutrality. True, §
903(a) enumerates rights accorded to all consumers for which they may
seek redress for violation, but this consumer protection is rendered all but
irrelevant by a clause in § 903(b) that limits the exercise of the enumerated
rights subject to the contract for service with the Internet service pro-
vider.265 Thus, the ISP could craft service agreements to curtail subscriber
255 Id. (referring to the statement as the "Broadband Policy Statement").
256 Id. at 27.
257 H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (as reported by Senator Stevens with an amendment in the
nature of a substitute, Aug. 2006), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/ files/HR5252RS.pdf.
258 See The Benton Foundation, The Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities
Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2686/H.R. 5252), http://www.benton.org/index.php?q=node/3292
(last visited Oct. 14, 2006), for a summary of the major provisions of the bill. See also
Senate Communications Act of 2006 Brochure,
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/ files/SenateCommunicationActBrochure.pdf.
9 Communications Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, Title IX, §§ 901-13; see supra note 253.
260 Id. § 902.
161 Id. § 903(a).
262 id.
263 Id. § 907.
264 Id. § 908.
265 Id. § 903(b):
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
rights without violating the language of the statute. Moreover, because
nothing in the bill attempts to address actions by broadband operators to
discriminate among content, this same clause could be invoked to defend
against allegations of discrimination. If, in customer contracts, the operator
reserves the right to offer preferential treatment to its own content or to a
provider with whom it has special agreements, the customer's "freedom"
to access content and applications of her choosing is rendered meaningless
by the limitation permitted under § 903(b). Thus, the Internet Consumer
Bill of Rights transforms rights that should be guaranteed to all consumers
into rights each Internet provider decides to afford its subscribers.
Furthermore, the Senate legislation fails to account for the insidious na-
ture of Internet content discrimination and places the onus of detection and
reporting on the consumer. As discussed above, technologies now permit
network operators the ability to differentiate packets instantaneously and
direct their delivery through the network according to proprietary traffic
management schemes that are undetectable to the average consumer.2" If
consumers are to take the role of investigators, Congress must provide
them with the necessary information and tools to recognize when they have
been the victim of discriminatory Internet practices. The inclusion of the §
903(b) limitation clause, however, eliminates the opportunity for any stan-
dardized detection tools because it permits the terms of violations to be set
by the providers themselves.
B. The Right Solution for Net Neutrality: Mandated Obligations and Public
Monitoring
Congress must adopt net neutrality legislation that will shift the burden
of compliance from consumers to the network operators, require that the
FCC promulgate rules and procedures to enforce the law, and demand ac-
countability from network operators by encouraging public monitoring of
the Internet.
NO INTERFERENCE WITH THE INTERNET.-A subscriber may exercise any of
the rights enumerated in [the Internet Consumer Bill of Rights]-
(1) without interference from any Federal, State, or local government, except as
specifically authorized by law;
(2) without interference from an Internet service provider, except as otherwise
provided by law;
(3) for any legal purpose; and
(4) subject to the limitations of the Internet service such subscriber has purchased.
266 See discussion supra Part III.D.
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1. The Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006
Senator Ron D. Wyden has threatened to block a vote on the Senate's
Communications Act of 2006267 if it does not include language similar to
the provisions in his own net neutrality bill, the Internet Non-
Discrimination Act of 2006.268 Wyden's measure is narrowly construed and
focuses only on the issue of net neutrality, presenting a framework
whereby discrimination by network operators is per se illegal and outlining
explicit obligations of broadband network providers in ensuring net neu-
trality.
269
The Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006 as introduced is not per-
fect. For example, the requirement that network operators "treat all data
traveling over or on communications in a non-discriminatory way"27 dem-
onstrates a lack of appreciation for Internet content and applications such
as VoIP and streaming video which demand a certain amount of "discrimi-
267 See John Eggerton, Wyden Puts 'Hold' on Telecom Bill, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
June 29, 2006, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6348408.html; see also Anne
Veigel, Rush Backs Lobby Efforts Pushing Telecom Bill in Senate, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 20,
2006 ("HR-5252's future is unclear. Sen. Wyden (D-Ore.) has a hold on the measure, mean-
ing a cloture petition must be filed to override his objection.").
268 Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006, S. 2360, 109th Cong. (2006)
269 S. 2360 § 4:
(a) In General- A network operator shall-
(1) not interfere with, block, degrade, alter, modify, impair, or change any bits,
content, application or service transmitted over the network of such operator;
(2) not discriminate in favor of itself or any other person, including any affiliate
or company with which such operator has a business relationship in-
(A) allocating bandwidth; and
(B) transmitting content or applications or services to or from a subscriber in the
provision of a communications;
(3) not assess a charge to any application or service provider not on the network
of such operator for the delivery of traffic to any subscriber to the network of
such operator;
(4) offer communications such that a subscriber can access, and a content pro-
vider can offer, unaffiliated content or applications or services in the same man-
ner that content of the network operator is accessed and offered, without interfer-
ence or surcharges;
(5) allow the attachment of any device, if such device is in compliance with part
68 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, without restricting any application or
service that may be offered or provided using such a device;
(6) treat all data traveling over or on communications in a non-discriminatory
way;
(7) offer just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions on
the offering or provision of any service by another person using the transmission
component of communications;
(8) provide non-discriminatory access and service to each subscriber; and
(9) post and make available for public inspection, in electronic form and in a
manner that is transparent and easily understandable, all rates, terms, and condi-
tions for the provision of any communications.
270 S.2360 § 4(6).
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nation" in order to ensure basic functionality and quality of service. Ad-
dressing this is concern is a matter of minor edits and should not halt the
inclusion of the language into the Senate's omnibus bill so it can move to
conference. Provided that this issue is addressed, Wyden's proposal is the
best option for mandating that the Internet remains a vibrant platform for
content and applications innovation.
Furthermore, Wyden's legislation would not preclude the ability of
broadband network providers to develop tiered access plans, whereby they
could set prices for consumer services according to traditional methods of
profit maximization, including price discrimination. Contrary to much of
the rhetoric conflating the two, net neutrality and price discrimination are
not necessarily mutually exclusive.27' Moreover, it behooves networked
companies to engage in price discrimination in order to recoup their in-
vestments while gaining the critical customer mass necessary to enjoy
positive network effects.272 In markets where consumers can be identified
and separated according to their individual demand elasticity, employing
legal price discrimination increases overall economic welfare: consumers
can access the product at the level at which they are willing to pay, and the
company is able to capture revenue across the demand curve, thereby
maximizing profits.273
2. Performance Monitoring: Public Enforcement
While the Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006 solves much of the
concerns regarding net neutrality, it does not prescribe models for identify-
ing violations of the neutrality obligations. A lack of empirical measures to
ensure accountability could undermine the efficacy of the law. To that end,
the bill should include language requiring the FCC inquire into methodolo-
gies that permit consumer monitoring of Internet access and make the re-
sults of that inquiry available to the public.
Some technologists advocate the adoption of a volunteer distributed
computing system in which individual users connect their computers via
the Internet to provide constant performance monitoring of network pro-
viders' Web traffic management processes.274 One possible system would
model the SETI@home scheme, which harnesses the power of thousands
271 See discussion supra Part V.
272 See discussion of positive network effects, supra Part IV.C. 1.
273 See BAUMOL, supra note 189, at 9.
274 See Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC), Volunteer
Computing, http://boinc.berkeley.edu/volunteer.php, for an explanation of volunteer com-
puting and its uses.
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of personal computers when they are not in use to analyze radio signals for
signs of extra-terrestrials. 275 As one Internet activist notes,
[a] SETI@home-style client that measured the performance of different
networks and ISPs from millions of points on the Internet could go far to-
ward creating an impartial, empirical picture of how ISPs, telcos and long-
haul carriers do business. It would help ... users hold our ISPs to account
for bad practices ..... And of course, it would be useful for giving an en-
forcer the inferential basis for investigating potential cases of [net neutral-
ity violations].276
If the Commission made such a client available to the public for
download, the need for actual enforcement might well disappear as the
pressure of public accountability would force network operators to volun-
tarily comply with the statute rather than face the negative publicity of a
breach.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Internet Non-Discrimination Act is a workable solution acceptable
to the disparate interests in the net neutrality debate. By codifying net neu-
trality principles into an enforceable legal framework, Congress can mini-
mize the likelihood that those the economic incentives of discrimination
and the technological tools to facilitate it are not abused to optimize com-
mercial output and control at the expense of consumer and public welfare.
Furthermore, network owners should be allowed and encouraged to prac-
tice legitimate economic maximization techniques, but be prohibited from
engaging in tactics that leverage market power and facility control to ex-
clude rivals. This compromise should assuage some of the concerns re-
garding the ability of network owners to extract sufficient revenue to re-
coup investment, and will create the additional incentive for continued
infrastructure investment in order to capture differentiated customers.277
Finally, in promoting public participation in the form of monitoring net-
work provider performance, the Congress and the Commission can ensure
compliance through empirical evidence and public pressure. Only through
a combination of these approaches will net neutrality and the future of the
Internet be preserved.
275 Ian Sample, Scientists, Be On Guard ... ET Might Be a Malicious Hacker, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2005,
http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/O,16559,1650296,00.html. See also
SETI@home, http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
276 Cory Doctorow, Opinion: Protecting Net Neutrality from the Neutricidal Telcos,
INFORMATIONWEEK, June 26, 2006,
http://informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 189600971.
277 See Frischmann, supra note 17, at 979.
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